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IN LUCE TUA
Comment on Contemporary Affairs by the Editor

Why the GOP Will Win in 1988
January. The beginning of a new year. Time to reveal to a breathless nation the outcome of the presidential race in 1988.
Before any of our readers act imprudently on the
revelations that follow, they ought to know something
of the history of political activity of the person making
them. His first political act came in the spring of 1948
when he brought the mock Republican national convention of the Martin Street School's fifth grade in
Wellsville, New York to its feet with a stirring speech
placing in nomination the name of Harold Stassen.
Unfortunately (a case of art anticipating life) Stassen
lost the Martin Street nomination to Thomas Dewey.
Nothing daunted, the budding political prophet came
back the next fall to the sixth grade mock general election campaign to speak eloquently for Dewey against
Harry Truman, an effort so effective that Martin
Street bucked the national trend and voted decisively
for Dewey (only the small-minded would argue that
the relative absence of Democrats in Wellsville had
anything to do with the outcome).
To bring the story up to date, faithful readers of
these columns will recall the occasion some five years
ago when Senator Ted Kennedy (acting, no doubt, in
a fit of personal spite) withdrew his name from presidential consideration within days of In Luce Tua assuring its readers that he would be the Democratic
nominee for 1984. For a time, we withdrew ourselves
from the arts of political prognostication, but in an act
of public service (and in blithe disregard of past performance) we hereby re-enter the lists.
In 1988, the Republican candidate (whoever he is)
will defeat the Democratic candidate (whoever he is).
Remember (unless things turn out otherwise) you read
it here first.
The reasons for the predicted outcome have only
partially to do with the particularities of the candidates
in the race for either party, but a full understanding
of the situation requires a rundown on the various
pretenders to the presidency.
First the Democrats. The desperateness of their condition is exemplified by the fact that their two leading
contenders, Gary Hart and Jesse Jackson, are utterly
unelectable. Hart's candidacy is a bad dirty joke and
everyone knows it, except, apparently, the candidate
himself and the 20-some per cent of Democratic voters
who (as of this writing) support his quixotic and renegade campaign. It is difficult to determine on which
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count Hart's arrogance registers higher: his ignoring
of his moral unfitness for the office he seeks or his
posturing concerning the "new ideas" on which his
candidacy presumably rides but which no one outside
his campaign staff can discern or define. If the Republican National Committee is not secretly channeling
money into Hart's campaign, it ought to be. He is
their dream candidate.
Except possibly for Jesse Jackson. Jackson's supporters contend that it is his color that makes his candidacy appear untenable. But it is not race that disqualifies Jackson (though racism of course persists); it is
rather his lack of significant political experience and
his radical ideological perspective. If Jesse Jackson
were white, he would not today be a serious candidate
for the nomination. He cannot win, but he will almost
certainly attract enough delegates to exercise significant influence on the choice of the nominee and the
drafting of the party platform. In both matters, he
will push the Democrats to the left, and in so doing
he will damage their chances for victory next
November.
Among the rest of the Democrats, Michael Dukakis
and Paul Simon rise most obviously to the surface of
plausibility. Both hold firmly to the left-liberal orthodoxy that party activists require of prospective candidates, yet neither has the manner of an ideologue.
But there's little excitement in these two, either. For
all his manifest competence and intelligence, Dukakis
attracts more respect than enthusiasm. Simon has
gained a deserved reputation for decency and integrity, and party activists admire his willingness openly
to declare himself a liberal. (It says a great deal about
our political culture that while candidates may speak
freely of being "compassionate" or even "progressive,"
it is still seen to require considerable courage to attach
the L word to oneself.) Simon has managed to some
degree to turn his earnest drabness to his own advantage (no PR glitz there), but one still wonders how well
he would wear over the course of a general election
campaign.
The remaining three declared candidates-Bruce
Babbitt, Richard Gephardt, and Albert Gore-are all
improbables, though not necessarily impossibles. Babbitt, an attractive candidate in many ways, unfortunately comes across on TV as a victim from a Rolaids
ad (unfair, but there it is). Gephardt earned a reputation as a talented legislator, but has also earned distrust as an unprincipled political chameleon, notably
for his reversal on abortion policy from pro-life to
3

pro-choice just at the time he began to consider a run
for the presidency; it's hard to see any reason for the
switch other than political expediency. Gore would
probably be the party's best candidate in the South-a
region essential to the Democrats-but his departures
(however mild) from liberal orthodoxy on defense and
foreign policy issues have made him unacceptable to
many in the party establishment in the North.
Since none of the candidates has caught fire, the notion persistently arises that the party convention next
summer will vote "none of the above" on those already
declared and turn elsewhere: the names of Mario
Cuomo, Bill Bradley, and Sam Nunn receive most frequent mention. Should that occur, the political calculus could change significantly, but the odds against
it happening remain high (though diminished from
what they were a few months ago).
On the Republican side, the great surprise thus far
has been the failure of Jack Kemp to emerge as a
major contender. We had confidently assumed that he
would consolidate the conservative activists behind his
candidacy and become a finalist for the nomination
against either George Bush or Robert Dole. (Those inclined to risk the family silver on the assurance offered above of a Republican victory in November
might wish to reconsider their options at this point.)
Kemp obviously has been hurt by the comparatively
strong showing of Pat Robertson. Robertson is the
GOP's Jesse Jackson, a contender whose support
within the party is insufficient to allow him to capture
the nomination but is more than sufficient to damage
the party's prospects because of the fear and antagonism his candidacy arouses among the general
public. But Kemp's problems go beyond Robertson; he
simply has failed to galvanize the Republican Right, a
failure for which it remains very difficult to account.
Since no one takes seriously the candidacies of
either Pierre S. ("call me Pete") du Pont IV or AI ("I'm
in control here at the White House") Haig, that appears to leave the GOP nomination to either Bush or
Dole. Both are competent and experienced men ,
though neither-like Dukakis or Simon among the
Democrats-sets off waves of enthusiasm. Each is
struggling, with mixed results, to offset certain image
problems: Dole, seen by many as too abrasive during
his 1976 campaign for Vice President, has so held
himself under restraint during debates as to suggest
terminal boredom, while Bush, plagued throughout
his career with the "wimp" label (odd, considering his
genuinely impressive-and unwimpish-resume) , occasionally tries too hard to prove that he is indeed a man
among men.
If neither party has a self-evident advantage in likely
candidates (though the leading Republicans have
4

fewer "negatives" with voters than do the leading
Democrats) why the assurance of a Republican victory?
Ideology has less to do with it than was the case in
1980 or 1984. American voters are still generally conservative, though not so markedly so as in recent
years. There is a great rush for the moderate center:
Democrats insist that they're humane but not softheaded ; Republicans portray themselves as realists
with warm hearts. As already noted, the L word is still
out, but caring and compassion (though always within
budget restraints) appear on broad display. Democratic candidates generally present themselves as rather
Jess liberal than they in fact are, while most Republicans take on mildly progressive coloring to moderate
their conservative instincts. It's as if both parties recognize, whatever their own inner desires, that most voters are looking for what might be termed "Reaganism
with a human face"-government much as before but
with rather more attention paid to those on the margins of society.
The simple reality of the situation can be located in
recent presidential voting history. The Republicans
have won four of the last five elections (after losing
seven of the previous nine), and their only Joss-a narrow one to Jimmy Carter in 1976--<:ame when they
were burdened with the memory of Watergate, the
pardon of Richard Nixon, and a bland and unelected
incumbent. Even then, Gerald Ford would likely have
won had the Democrats not been wise enough (for a
change) to nominate a southerner.
The fact is that in America today, while there are
still more registered Democrats than Republicans ,
there are more natural Republican presidential voters
than Democratic ones. (Nominal party allegiance
weakens at the presidential level, especially among
Democrats. One can sum up the situation with the
shorthand observation that the New Deal coalition is
quite thoroughly dead.) The GOP now has a substantial advantage, other things equal, in the South and
the West, and the Democrats begin each presidential
campaign at a significant disadvantage. We won't bore
you with statistics, but the figures are there. Republicans also gain by their general advantage in smaller
states, which have disproportionate weight in the electoral college system.
Does this mean a Republican victory is guaranteed?
Not quite. "Other things equal," the Republicans win,
but equal other things seldom are. But with current
conditions of peace and prosperity, and with the likelihood of a Republican candidate at least as presentable
in personal terms as his Democratic opponent, the
GOP has considerably more reason for optimism about
next November than have the Democrats. The RepubCl
licans could lose, but they'll have to work at it.
The Cresset

Constance Gengenbach

ACADEMIC LIFE: VOCATION OR CAREER?
Reflections on the Meaning of Christian Vocation-It

(Editor's Note: This is the second part of a two-part essay.)

In the first part of this essay I discussed the secularization of Christian vocation, and in particular its application to the worship of work so dominant in contemporary society and among students in church colleges.
My conclusion was that the secularization of vocation
into the world of work was not bad because it allows
us to recognize and affirm the uniquely incarnational
quality of the Christian message. Grace and Judgment
encounter us in the world, and in the world, including
our work, we must respond.
Our response must not bow to the carnal worship of
work, but maintain the primacy of our calling as
Christians and keep work accountable to a higher purpose than maximum production, maximum profit, or
maximum personal success. This higher purpose must
reflect the biblical message of the affirmation of life,
through the care of the earth and the care and development of whole people. To maintain our Christian
vocation in secularized life we must recognize the
words of both Judgment and Grace we encounter in
our work and in our attitudes toward work.
In this second part of the essay I wish to apply this
incarnational Lutheran theology-as opposed to the
Two Kingdoms variety of Lutheran theology which
too often collapses into dualism-to what has been
called the academic vocation. In a recent article in
these pages' editor Jim Nuechterlein expressed himself
skeptical about the possibilities of uniting faith and
learning, which he said "exist largely on different
planes and are incapable of essential fusion or integration." It seems to me that one arrives at this position
at least in part because of a too easy acceptance of cer-

Constance Gengenbach completed this essay shortly before
her death from cancer last September at the age of 42. She
was Associate Professor of History and Senior Tutor of the
Paracollege at St. Olaf College.
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tain post-Enlightenment assumptions about what is the
purpose of education and the university, and how the
calling of knowledge relates to other callings.
To put it briefly, we have assumed that academic
life is a calling because the pursuit of knowledge is intrinsically a higher purpose than the pursuit of technical training leading to job security. To buttress this assumption we have marshalled quotations from all the
ages about knowledge and its meaning, and we have
assumed that this rhetoric fits us and the way we actually practice the academic life. I will contend that historical circumstances and intellectual context has
changed so much since the enunciation of these high
ideals for knowledge that in fact we are far closer to
being technically trained practitioners of a career than
we are to those who originally bespoke the dignity of
knowledge as a calling.
Secondly, our career orientation has helped us to assume all too easily that the only purpose of the university is "an endless quest for truth." 2 This is indeed one
purpose for the university, and one not to be surrendered, but historically there have been others which
we are in danger of leaving behind. And ironically,
just our current positions on the nature of the university are hardest to integrate with Christian faith. I
hope to show that if we uncover the true historical
roots of the calling of knowledge and of liberal education we can be alerted to ways in which we can hear
words both of Grace and of Judgment in our daily
work as academics, a work which we are in danger of
carnalizing from a vocation into a career.
First let me examine the other historical possibilities
for the purpose of colleges such as ours. It is true that
one view of the purpose of learning is the speculative
ideal, involving constant application of the critical
process to all things. This begins with Socrates, and is
resuscitated for a time in the medieval schoolmen. Its
tools of criticism are at first dialectic but later, with the
'James Nuechterlein, "Faith and Learning in the Christian
University," The Cresset (December, 1986), p. 10.
2
lbid.
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Scientific Revolution and the En lightenment, the
methods of natural science come more to the fore.
This heritage of learning fits Nuechterlein's "endless
quest for truth" tolerably well.
But there has always been another ideal of education in the West, associated with the artes liberates
ideaP This view of education was developed by Cicero
and Quintilian, harkening back to !socrates. The purpose of education was to train the good citizen or
leader, the virtuous orator capable of addressing any
subject with eloquence, wisdom, and judgment.•

By the eighteenth century nature
herself was autonomous, and the
Christian God was removed to the
position of prime mover or, in a
vague way, guarantor of the moral
law through punishment after death.
The artes liberates ideal taught respect for a clear set
of values and familiarity with classic texts which embodied them. It was this vision of education, and not
the speculative one, that informed the various early
medieval syntheses between classical learning and
Christianity. It was revived in the Renaissance and became the foundation of several patterns of "learned
piety" in the Reformation as well.
These two patterns of education, the speculative and
the artes liberales, have stood in fruitfu l and exciting
tension for over 2,000 years. But when faculty at liberal arts colleges of the church buy completely into the
speculative ideal, with its specialized research orientation , an essential part of this vivid dialogue is lost, and
so is an essential part of their real contribution as
educators. Education must be seen to deal with people
and their abilities-including judgment, values, eloquence, and service-and not just with truth, especially
since truth in modern academe can be discussed and
verified only in ever more narrow and specialized discourse.
I do not believe that most of the historic statements
about knowledge as a vocation support a vision of
truth as an end in itself, to be pursued with endless
application of refined critical tools. From the seventeenth century or so when the vocation of knowledge
slowly emerged as an autonomous calling separate
from religious faith , it was still overarched with
'See Bruce A. Kimball , Orators and Philosophers: A History
of the Idea of Liberal Education (New York, 1986).
•See Eugene Rice, The R enaissance Idea of Wisdom (Cambridge, Mass., 1958).
6

broader human purposes for knowledge. Particularly
French thinkers like Descartes announced the scien tific
agenda of taming the world through knowledge and
bending it to human desires. Here is Descartes' vision
in 1637:
. . . it is possible to reach knowledge that will be of
much utility in this life; and that instead of the speculative philosophy now taught in the schools we can find
a practical one, by which, knowing the nature and behavior .. . of all bodies which surround us ... we can
employ these entities . .. and so make ourselves masters
and possessors of nature.
Specifically he mentions invention of an "infinity of
devices to enjoy the fruits of agriculture and all the
wealth of the earth without labor," but also the possibility to "rid ourselves also of an infinity of maladies
of body as well as of mind" and perhaps also conquer
old age .5 No impediment to this work exists save
human capacity to think, experiment, and share the
results .
The scientific strain of the vocation of knowledge
continually emphasized that knowledge meant power,
control of nature. Seventeenth-century thin kers, Descartes and Bacon included, saw this power at least formally within the context of God's continuous creation
and sustenance of nature. By the eighteenth century
nature herself was autonomous, and the Christian God
was removed to the position of prime mover or, in a
vague way, guarantor of the moral law through
punishment after death. For the philosophes increased
knowledge meant not only better practical control of
nature, but also increased human virtue and hap piness. Advances in natural science in the nineteenth
century further inflated the vision of the power of scientific knowledge. In 1880 novelist Emil Zola wrote:
We shall enter a time when all-powerful man will have
enslaved nature and learnt to use her laws to establish
on earth the greatest possible range of justice and freedom. There is no purpose more noble, more lofty,
more great. This is where our part as intelligent beings
lies: we must penetrate the why of things in order to
dominate them , and reduce them to the state of obedient machinery.•
Much cou ld be said about the differences between
this vision of nature and man's relationship to it and
that found in the Bible, where occasionally the concept
of mastery is found , but more frequently the charge
is care, culture, stewardship.' But another strain of
' Descartes, Discourse on Method (1637) (New York, 1956).
•Emile Zola, The Experimental Novel (1886).
' Claus Westermann , "Work, Civilization, and Culture in
the Bible," Concilium: Work and Religion (Nimjwegen,
Edinburgh, N.Y., 1980), pp. 82-83.
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knowledge as a calling developed its own rebuttal to
this scientific view. This was the humanistic version of
the calling of knowledge . It was perhaps more hospitable to the Biblical tradition but distinct from it.
Blaise Pascal recognized that in addition to the esprit
de geometrie which dominated scientific endeavors, the
world could also be approached with an esprit de finesse,
of insight or intuition into inward meanings. This observation is fully developed only later, in the Romantic
rebellion against the Enlightenment. Not dominion but
understanding is emphasized. The goal of progressive
control of the environment is denounced as shallow,
while progressive growth in virtue through knowledge
is denied outright.
Johann Gottfried Herder thunders "you Voltaires,
you Humes , you Robertsons, classic twilight phantoms,
what are you in the light of truth?" In its romantic
version, the special calling of the knower is to provide
insight into the human heart-an insight enabled not
by experiment or manipulation of data, but by love
and Einfuhlung-fellow-feeling or intuition.
Feeling can provide true insight into the nature of
the world as well, though it cannot be conveyed in ordinary language. For Beethoven a higher insight into
the harmony of all creation could only be expressed by
music. In music man has a means to grasp the
"boundless universal . .. which without it would remain occult, unnoticed, unsuspected ."8 In this version
of the calling to knowledge, the knower actually participates in the divine, and his calledness is quite
explicit. "Rare are the chosen ones," Beethoven is supposed to have said. In the same vein, romantics could
variously call music, history, or poetry priesthoods. 9
Still, it is less their own capacity which they celebrate
than the truth which they perceive and allow to speak
through the forms they create. A few romantics went
on to formalize this essentially artistic vision into a specific social role. One example is Samuel Taylor Coleridge's idea of a clerisy, or a group of priestly knowers
given social privileges so that they could body forth a
higher vision of truth for their contemporaries.
Thomas Carlyle's image is vivid :
Genius, Poet: do we know what these words mean? An
inspired soul once more vouchsafed us, direct from Nature's own great fire-heart, to see the Truth , and speak
it and do it.' 0
Beethoven, letter to Goethe, May 10, 1810, quoted in
Bettina Brentano, Goethe's Correspondence with a Child (Boston, 1876).
9
Beethoven and Wagner saw music this way; Ranke
claimed priesthood for history, and Friedrich Schlegel
and Novalis for poetry, to name just a few examples.
10
Thomas Carlyle, Past and Present (1843) (London , 1960),
pp. 96, 83.
8
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Truth comes through insight, and the poet is priest.
Examples could be multiplied for many pages, but it
should be clear that by the nineteenth century both
science and humanistic knowledge had appropriated a
vision of vocation for their work. In one case the ultimate end was to be creation of a better life for humanity, and in the other a higher truth about life and
the human heart. Despite its independence from formal religion, this calling was a priestly one. The knowers proffered their truths to the rest, but they were
specially gifted because of their knowledge. I believe
that these visions of knowledge as a calling are still
part of our consciousness as academics, and inform a
fair amount of our rhetoric yet today.
But do we in our modern, professionalized, specialized age really approach our work as academics in this
spirit? Or is academic life more a "career," defined by
Robert Bellah as a "course of professional life or employment that offers advancement or honor." Career
has no face-to-face community, but instead operates
with a combination of personal standards of excellence
and a national system of occupations governed by
quantitative laws of supply and demand.
The industrializing of American society meant the
end of economic life as a community of callings and
the rise of a corporate society organized around competing careers. Bellah sees the modern research university as one of those corporate entities, and the
heroic man of science as one who has "exchanged general citizenship in society for membership in the community of the competent."" We might protest that the
heritage of the modern research university is far older
than industrialization and the notion of career. We can
hearken back to the University of Berlin, founded in
1810, to find our crucial modern academic principles
of total academic freedom and the mutual support of
specialized research and teaching. But here again,
there is only a surface similarity between our vision of
research and that of the founders of the University of
Berlin. First of all , they were steeped in eighteenthcentury neohumanism, which saw the aim of education
as Bildung, "full and harmonious training of the whole
individual, and formation of an aesthetically pleasing,
cultivated personality."
For the founders of Berlin, disciplined learning or
Wissenschaft constituted a "universitas, " or organic totality.'2 There existed a single all-embracing truth to be
investigated from every side with critical methods. In
the Gymnasium students had received basic general
education. In the university they were to be intro"Bellah, quoting Thomas Haskell, The Emergence of Professional Social Science (Urbana, Ill. , 1977).
2
' The term is Schelling's. See Hajo Holborn, A History of
Modern Germany, II (New York, 1959), pp. 472 ff.
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duced to the creative process of searching out the
truth, rather than receiving a body of current information. This was not only to arouse their curiosity and
enthusiasm, but it was to become a force in their personal moral and ethical development, or Bildung. In
Wilhelm von Humboldt's words:
As soon as one stops searching for knowledge, or if one
imagines that it need not be creatively sought in the
depths of the human spirit but can be assembled extensively by collecting and classifying facts, everything is irrevocably and forever lost. . . . For only that learning
which comes from the inside and can be transplanted
into the inside can transform character; and humanity
in general cares little about knowledge and talk, but a
great deal about character and actions."
Wissenchaft (disciplined knowledge) is not a collection
of current knowledge but a process of inquiry. It is an
end in itself only insofar as the inward truth of things
speaks to the inwardness of individuals, and can therefore serve as an agency in the formation of human
character. Education therefore had a great deal to do
with the lives of participants, at least as much as pursuit of a speculative ideal of truth.
Neither was true knowledge only what individual
specialized scholars found it to be. Lest we think Humboldt did not know the real academic world, this is
what he wrote to his wife while in the midst of the
university project:

You have no idea with how much difficulty I have to
struggle, above all with the scholars-the unruliest and
most difficult to pacify of all peoples. They besiege me
with their eternally self-thwarting interests, their
jealousy, their envy, their passion to govern, their onesided opinions, in which each believes that his discipline
alone has earned support and encouragement.'•
This might be called the "Dean's lament," and we
can imagine it becoming louder in the years after
1830. When German idealism broke down , the vision
of philosophy as an integrating element in the study
of a spiritually unified body of knowledge was lost.
Wissenschaft now meant only the specialized knowledge
of individual disciplines . The elements of character
formation and an integrated vision of life were lost.
According to Hajo Halborn, "after 1870 German
universities turned out chiefly specialized experts,
whose general education was poor." ' 5 It is ironic that
" Wilhelm von Humboldt, "On the Inner and Outer
Organization of the Higher Institution of Learning in
Berlin" (fragment of 1809), in Humanist Without Portfolio:
The Writings of Wilhelm von Humboldt, Marianne Cowan,
trans. (Detroit, 1963), p. 134.
" Humboldt, letter to his wife dated 1809, cited in ibid., p. 26.
5
' Holborn, II , p. 482.
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at just this point young American students were attending German universities in droves and bringing
their ideals back to American universities. Increasingly
through the twentieth century good liberal arts colleges have staffed themselves with faculty trained in
universtttes oriented to specialized research, the
academic career rather than teaching or learning as a
vocation.
After industrialization and the disintegration of German idealists, the third fact to speed the transition of
the scholarly vocation to the scholarly profession was
the development of precise scientific methodology in
the natural sciences, the emerging social sciences, and
the humanities alike. In Max Weber's classic 1917 lecture "Science as a Vocation," all the lineaments of the
modern academic profession emerge clearly. For
Weber academic vocation necessarily means specialization, and absolutely single-minded devotion to work as
well. He will hear nothing of Bildung or aesthetic selfformation, but only of the specialized discipline. This
is not the earlier vocation which claimed that knowledge could tell us the true conditions of existence, or
the path to virtue, or the meaning of the universe.
Who-aside from certain big children who are indeed
found in the natural sciences-still believes that the
findings of astronomy, biology, physics, or chemistry
could teach us anything about the meaning of the
world? If there is any such "meaning," along what road
could one come upon its tracks? If these natural sciences lead to anything in this way, they are apt to make
the belief that there is such a thing as the "meaning" of
the universe die out at its very roots. '6
The theme most vividly asserted by Weber is that
academic disciplines can give us technological tools for
mastery and intellectual tools for gaining clarity about
our assumptions and the consequences of our position,
but they cannot give us values. They cannot answer directly the question: "What shall we do and how shall
we live?"
Weber's sophistication is exactly in that he enunciates the limits of science. He has none of the illusions
found in the older vocation of knowledge. In his view
the academic vocation can provide tools but none of
the ends and purposes for which to use them. His own
solution is the stoic one, to "bear the fate of the times
like a man."
The difference between our modern academic
careers and the historical examples of the vocation of
knowledge is that we live at the end of what Weber
has called a process of demystification . All dimensions
of ultimate purpose and human value which once
'

6

Max Weber, "Science as a Vocation," in Hans H. Gerth
and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber (New York, 1946).
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overarched life and work in the academic vocation
have been removed. The ideal framework around
knowledge in previous centuries, the grand visions of
liberal education, or human service, or Humboldt's
formation of character through inquiry, have all been
gradually shed, leaving specialized knowledge as an
end in itself.
Sophisticated practitioners of the academic vocation
have recognized the limits of knowledge, and admitted
that they could not identify the purpose or meaning
of human life. Ironically, the abdication of the sophisticated left the field open to crasser views, where "experts" enunciate false or partial values such as power,
production, or the triumph of the American way. Or
they identify no values at all, but simply continue to
do what they have always done.

Sophisticated practioners of the
academic vocation have recognized the
limits of knowledge, and admitted
that they could not identify the
purpose or meaning of human life.
This nearly rote accumulation of more and more
specialized knowledge can all too easily be defended as
"pursuit of the truth." Secularization of the vocation of
knowledge into specialized disciplines has left education an unsolved problem. Colleges still struggle continuously with encouraging teaching along with research, and struggle sporadically with integration in
the curriculum. But there is little agreement as to what
constitutes good teaching, and the course of study
even in liberal-arts colleges threatens to become simply
an assemblage of individual disciplines, with connections between them accidental if they exist at all."
Can the modern, specialized academic career, denuded as it is from a context in values or a broader
community of human responsibility, be productively
joined with Christian vocation in a college of the
church? How can we use our calling as Christians to
liberate us from the tyranny of the standards of our
work , which in their own way are no less carnal than
those of banking or business or technical activity?
True, secularization of the academic vocation has
meant in many cases that knowledge has moved away
from faith, but in response faith has frequently abandoned knowledge and the world, too. The irony of
this response is that in trying to maintain the purity of
biblical calling, it has in effect left daily life in the
"See Report of the American Association of Colleges,
Integrity in the Curriculum (Washington, D.C., 1985).
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world to its own devices. It has not challenged and
tested this age, the saeculum, to see where God's Grace
is imbedded within it, and where Judgment. I believe
that clinging to the Two Kingdoms and asserting that
not much fusion is possible between academic life and
Christian vocation has the same effect.
Dualism, separation between Christian ethics and
the world, is not in the true tradition of Lutherans
either. Luther was richly aware of the incarnational dimensions of all life. He showed it in his treatment of
the sacraments, his love of nature and music and
learning. Luther knew the true substance of incarnational theology-that we encounter God's Grace and
his Judgment in, with, and under the ordinary experiences of life. Centuries of Lutheran practice have all
too often lost that unity, and, as H. Richard Niebuhr
wrote, have separated "Luther's interactionism of the
gospel working by love in the world of culture" into a
"parallelistic dualism of separated spiritual and temporal life."' 8
The academic vocation in a church college cannot
fall victim to such dualism. Instead we should identify
the incarnational dimension of both our history and
our current lives, to affirm the gifts of Grace and be
aware of the warnings we find there. As Dorothy
Soelle argues, this is what we were created to do, actually created three times: once in God's image to be
cocreators with him in the world; once in history, attested to by the Exodus story when God led his people
out of slavery into the land of freedom; and a third
time, in our baptism into death and rebirth in Jesus
Christ.
The old being who must die is not only the egocentric;
she is also the powerless human being who feels incapable of changing anything in her world .... '9
We are, in a word, not only created for hope but for
choice and for action. Our true vocation is thus singular, the calling to participate in and fulfill God's promises. This vocation can help us approach our other
heritages. In each of the visions of academic vocation
which have touched the church college there has been
something to affirm and celebrate. In each there are
things which must be renounced; and in each there
are clear institutional actions which, though politically
and practically difficult, can and should be taken.
What can we keep of the modern calling of the professional academic, and what must we temper or leave
behind? We can surely celebrate knowledge. Our abilH. Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture (New York, 1951),
p. 179.
9
' Dorothy Soelle, To Work and to Love: A Theology of Creation (New York, 1984), pp. 164-165.
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ity to know creation in its inward and outward dimensions is one of the great gifts offered us as beings
formed in God's image. It can be an avenue toward
worship as well, when we reveal and celebrate the intricacy of that creation, "the proof of God's Providence
in the anatomy of a louse." 20
This kind of celebration of God's world is as possible
in scientific knowledge as it is in the humanities. In
fact, the two versions of knowledge are complementary and mutually corrective. Without knowledge
which aims at action and control there is no disciplined way to change and improve life. Without
knowledge as insight into the wondrous parable of
existence there is no connection with purposes, values,
or truths that transcend manipulation.
It has been suggested that the proper task of the
church college is to "resist the process of intellectualization" which has been the fate of Western culture! '
I disagree, and not only because, as Martin Marty puts
it, "Christianity will have a hard time having its voice
heard if the public deduces that our colleges and universities settle for people who reproduce knowledge
and filter it through the glass of Christian greenhouses
where students are protected from the unorthodoxies
where adventure, and thus learning, occurs." 22
Even beyond this, we should continue to deepen
and broaden our knowledge because it is the most
sophisticated and thoughtful knowledge which has a
sense of its own limits, and the givens outside of which
it cannot operate. Only charlatanism claims quick and
total solutions through research and technology. At its
best, knowledge itself will show the limits of knowledge. As Max Weber put it, "the devil of intellectualism is old, and so you must grow old to understand him." 23
By the best and deepest of knowledge I do not
mean the most sophisticated manipulation of reality.
The warning of Judgment to be heard about our pursuit of knowledge is that too often we worship such
"Swammerdam, cited by Max Weber, "Science as a Vocation," p. 142.
21
Mark R. Schwehn, "Academics as a Vocation ," The Cresset (April and May, 1985).
22
Martin Marty, response to Mark Schwehn in "The Academic Vocation Revisited ," The Cresset (September, 1985).
2
' Weber, "Science as a Vocation ," p. 152. The full passage
is: "This does not mean age in the sense of the birth certificate. It means that if one wishes to settle with this
devil, one must not take to flight before him as so many
like to do nowadays. First of all , one has to see the devil's
ways to the end in order to realize his power and his limitations." Weber stopped with asserting the limits of
knowledge, however, and preferred a prideful stoic response to the issue-"bear it like a man" (p. 150). See
Schwehn for an opposite interpretation of Weber's position.
2
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manipulation, and fail to approach our disciplines with
sufficient thoughtfulness and profundity. Max Weber
and other thinkers at the end of the nineteenth century who struggled to develop reliable disciplinary
methods were very sensitive to philosophical questions
of meaning, purpose, and significance in specialized
knowledge.
Only when such a philosophical approach is taken
do the limits of our knowledge emerge clearly. Within
such a philosophical and historical context the practices of the academic disciplines show themselves to be
human intellectual constructs. Here again knowledge
as science and knowledge as letters stand as warnings,
each against the other. If the sciences approach their
own disciplinary methodology philosophically and historically, they are reminded of the limits of knowledge. The very productivity of science in life reminds
the humanities that timeless contemplation of the
human condition can be a dangerous aestheticism unless it reaches out to inform public discourse and action.
There are institutional policies and actions that follow from this discussion of the meaning of knowledge
in the light of Christian vocation. The philosophy and
history of the academic disciplines tend to be viewed
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in colleges as an intellectual luxury, a kind of trimming on the tree of the "hard knowledge" the disciplines have to offer. 24 Sometimes specialists themselves
view them that way, or assume that methods can simply be taught along with the real subject matter of biology or literature or sociology.
Our colleges must not allow this to be the case, because a sophisticated sense of method is a primary
bridge between modern knowledge and the sense of
the limits of human capacity which makes room for religious truth. It seems to me as practical today to require that newly hired faculty have a philosophical cast
of mind and thoughtful view of their disciplines as it
is to require that they be practicing Christians.
Methodological sensitivity in a discipline can insure
that it will be taught in ways that leave room for the
seed of faith to grow and mature, whether or not the
teacher shares that faith. The "enemy" of religious
faith is not modern knowledge , but knowledge too
shallowly conceived.
Can we also celebrate our second heritage as disciplinary specialists? Yes! Excellence, intellectual vitality,
discovery are all gifts of a creative God to the creature
in his image. We can celebrate our professional expertise, but we need not deify it. Specialized graduate
education in the twentieth century (perhaps already in
the nineteenth) is really technical training. It emphasizes the mastery of information and the most current techniques and bibliography more than it offers
a broad perspective either on knowledge or the relationship of knowledge to human life. This is as true
of the education of historians and specialists in
Romantic poetry as it is of sociologists and natural scientists. Such disciplines have cut up the pie of reality
and also the college curriculum into departmental
units.
This has been detrimental to the most urgent task
of late-twentieth-century education-the need for integration or coherence of some kind. The issue is not
simply one of political resistance to interdisciplinary
study. Some scholars find such study morally and intellectually objectionable and a betrayal of true
academic vocation, because the faculty participating in
interdisciplinary work deal with fields where they are
not experts.
This insistence on having "expert" knowledge has
24

Robert Bellah, in an appendix to Habits of the Heart
(Berkeley, 1985) entitled "Social Science as Public
Philosophy," pleads for a social science which synthesizes
historical, philosophical, and scientific approaches. He
sees the modern, specialized discipline not so much incapable of such an approach as uninterested in it (p. 298).
For a devastating description of the tenor of contemporary social science, see p. 300.
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also resulted in a one-sided view of what good teaching is. The disciplinary specialist tends to convey the
best and most up-to-date information and use the
most up-to-date critical and analytic tools and equipment. Active specialized scholarship helps to prepare
for this kind of teaching and it certainly has an important place on the college campus.
But what if good teaching is also something else?
What if it is awakening curiosity and stim ulating judgment and training eloquence? This kind of teaching
can easily be in conflict with modern specialized scholarship, simply because the student gets little practice at
independent inquiry and judgment but instead sits at
the feet of the expert.

Liberal arts colleges should see that
the importance of teaching is probably
greater than their role as creators of
knowledge, and extend this recognition
to their internal reward system.
Hajo Holborn has commented that even with the
finest specialized education that German universities
could offer, students failed to "acquire the knowledge
that would enable them to make critical judgments on
the fundamental questions of their own lives or general problems of the age. Most of them gained merely
professional training for a specific career, and in the
conduct of their later lives simply conformed to the
prevailing ethical standards of their social group." 25
Such an education is no education for a Christian
called to recognize and cooperate with God's work in
the world.
These warnings do not mean that we should d ispense with current professional standards or qualifications in the disciplines. They help us achieve the intellectual vibrancy that learning must have. But we do
need institutional policies that will balance and correct
the biases of the specialized disciplines.
It seems clear that the teaching function undertaken
by college faculties is done nowhere else in our society.
Liberal arts colleges must recognize that the importance of that role is probably greater than their role
as creators of new knowledge, and extend this recognition to their internal reward system and not only to
their conversations with prospective students. The
unique contribution of liberal arts colleges has much
more to do with the impact of knowled ge upon students than it does with the speculative ideal of the
"pursuit of truth." The technical specialized university
25

Holborn, III, p. 396.
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will always purvey more bits of truth than the small
college. We must recognize that the quality of studentfaculty encounter is our real gift, and we must intentionally cultivate this rather than "covering fields."
It is clear that the departmental domination of the
curriculum needs to be balanced by encouragement of
interdisciplinary and integrative studies. Such programs, where they exist, are usually marginal in the
curriculum and in the reward system of the college.
This must be changed, because not to do so deifies
professional expertise at the expense of teaching and
learning.

There are teaching techniques designed
to relax competitiveness-by using
group assignments, or ungraded
activities, or letting discussion
occur while the teacher is absent.
It also behooves us to relax our competitive professional ethos long enough to recognize that the peace,
love, and mercy so prominent in what Christians are
called to do are sometimes absent in the dynamics of
our classrooms and our professional activities. There
are teaching techniques designed to relax competitiveness-by using group assignments, for example, or ungraded activities, or letting discussion of material occur
when the teacher is out of the room. These sometimes
grate against our professional ideals of expertise,
thoroughness, and competence and our students' desire for graded success, but they foster remarkably
well those qualities of wonder and independent judgment which are so important in true learning. There
are cooperative methods of faculty evaluation which
could generate more improvement and less anxiety.
We must also recognize the falsity of many of the divisions created by education that narrow our sense of
community. The Western celebration of knowledge
has as it~ darker side a social and intellectual elitism
that forgets the simple laborer. Our ideal of liberal
education leads us to disdain "mere" technical or vocational training. To many in church colleges the
"problem of vocationalism" is defined as the need to
prevent training in technical fields from entering the
liberal arts college.
This problem simply evaporates when viewed in
light of the various traditions of vocation examined
here. In the biblical view of vocation no one kind of
work is superior to another if all are viewed and penetrated with a sense of God's incarnation among us
and our decision in response. Examination of the
academic vocation has shown that literature and his-
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tory can as easily be pursued as a form of technical
training as can business.
The choice between "liberal" and "vocational" education or a combination of both should depend on the
tradition and practical necessities of each college. Both
kinds of education and both kinds of work need to be
viewed as the arena of grace, but also judgment. We
need to defuse the defensiveness of liberal educators
about these practical concerns by creating programs
bridging theory and practice in economics and business, math and computers, and internships for students and faculty. We also need to liberalize the practical disciplines by challenging their assumptions about
what constitutes ultimate meaning and purpose in
human life.
We must make greater efforts to bridge other false
divisions separating us from community with the rest
of humanity. We need to rethink the liberal arts curriculum not only in view of the social elitism it represents, but to compensate for the monopoly of western
subject matter represented in its canon. Grace and
judgment meet us in the action of ideas and lives of
non-Western non-white non-males too . We also need
to challenge and put in perspective the values represented by the western canon-individualist, activist,
assertive, oriented toward practical achievement and
success-because these are the values of a materialized
vocation, not an incarnational one imbedded in the
secular world. The perspectives of women, the handicapped, and peace studies can show us new and unsuspected faces of grace and of education.
Joseph Sittler has said that the purpose of the
church college is that generation after generation shall
be sophisticated, that is, made wise about the realities
of human life. We, as academics, armed with the
truths and lies and puzzles and achievements and failures of human knowledge through the ages, can certainly do this. We must also annihilate innocence-"the
innocent understanding which remains untouched by
the misery and pain and ambiguity and uncertainty"
and also the magnificence and sheer giftedness of
life. 26
All this enables us to open to students and ourselves
the magnificent cosmic dimensions of the Gospel of
God's Grace in Jesus Christ, and to prevent us from
shrinking the Gospel to our own personal or cultural
size. But we must annihilate our own innocence tooour unthinking acceptance and parroting of the current goals of the modern multiversity. We can celebrate our vocation as professional academics, but our
vocation as Christians can give us the standards by
which to judge it too, and the courage to do so. Cl
Joseph Sittler, unpublished lecture from 1981.
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Alfred Cismaru

CONVERSATION WITH FRANCOISE SAGAN
Reflections on Art and Life

The following conversation took place last May in FranfOise Sagan's sumptuous Paris apartment, on its second floor,
where the telephone does not ring and where the maid is not
allowed to enter except during the absence of the mistress. She
offered champagne and whisky, but did not have any herself
because of a recent pancreas disorder. About an admirable
photograph on the piano, depicting a Parisian street, she
explained that it was her own work, that taking pictures was
one of her favorite hobbies, that she was proud of it. The discussion turned to her latest novel, Un Sang d'aquarelle, to
the process of writing, to money, to gambling, to life and
death, and to many other topics. Although she does not grant
interviews often, once one has managed to obtain an appointment, she is charming and she knows how to put one at ease.

QUESTION: You have many admirers. Many of
these d o not like your work but like you.
ANSWER: This is true. Recently, when I had that
accident in Bogota, I got a lot of mail. When I was
able to leave the hospital, people would stop me in the
street and ask me to have a drink with them. Even
today I am told: "Ah, you are well. I am so glad." It
is nice to hear it.
Q: To what do you attribute your image of a person
so close to many, so attractive?
A: I like people. I have no preconceived idea about
anyone. People must feel or know this. I think, also,
that unlike many writers of repute, I held on to a certain naturalness. I was told that this comes across
when I appear on television.
Q: On television one notes also your tone of voice,
very particular ...
A: Of course, you mean to say that I talk too fast,
so fast that I am incomprehensible. Maybe it is because

Alfred Cismaru is Professor of Romance Languages and
Comparative Literature at Texas Tech University. His article,
"Beyond Godot, Beyond Commitment: Samuel Beckett's Solitude," appeared in The Cresset in November, 1983.
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they can't understand me that they like me.
Q: At the beginning of your career you were not
liked. You were said to be the cause of so many scandals.
A: Of course there were scandals. Being successful
at age seventeen ... it's just not done.
Q: People did not like the idea that you were earning a great deal of money and that you were leading
a rather dissolute life. The media did not portray a
nice image of you.
A: No, but the public always found me pleasant. I
was making a lot of money and I was throwing it out
the window. But why not? There is a bourgeois reflex
that money must be saved, invested. My temperament
is more romanesque than economical, and the public
likes the romanesque.
Q: Your last novel, Un Sang d'aquarelle, has just appeared . Can you tell me how you write? During the
day, at night?
A: Always at night. There is too much noise during
the day. The telephone, people always droppin g in,
my son's friends. At night it is peaceful. I work from
midnight to 6 a.m. I always have a bad beginn ing; I
am malcontent; I stumble. And I don't manage to
work every night. But once I get started I hardly stop.
Ah, but getting started is so difficult. I have the first
sentence, but after ... there is so much blank paper.
It humiliates you. Then comes the flight, the nirvana.
And when I start believing in what I write, the pleasure is immense. One is king of the world .
Q: Do you like your books?
A: At the moment of the nirvana, yes. I feel some
tenderness for them for two or three months after
they are finished, then, when the public gets hold of
them, there is a divorce.
Q: Do you not reread them?
A: Never.
Q: Did you always want to write?
A: I began at age twelve. I was writing poems; very
bad poems. I was always reading. Even now I read a
great deal. I read day and night. I sleep very little, a
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couple of hours here and there.
Q: In Reponses, a collection of interviews you
granted, you said that Proust had genius, that you
have only talent. Will you never have genius?
A: I continue to dream that it might be possible. If
I didn't believe it I would stop writing. I write with the
hope that I will be really proud of my next book.
Q: In Un Sang d'aquarelle is there only talent?
A : That sentence you paraphrased about Proust, I
must have said it when I thought that there was a precise border between genius and talent. Today I don't
know. Of course, there is genius in Proust. That is evident. But he spent his life writing. He did little else.
I did a great deal more living than writing.
Q: Did you ever think of living less and becoming
a writer of genius?
A: No, of course not. Maybe if I were sure of becoming one I would consider it. But it would be very
difficult; and the result very uncertain. Proust stopped
living because he had asthma and he could no longer
run around. I don't have asthma.
Q: Do your foresee a day when you will stop writing? Do you have any desire to retire?
A: There are so many idiots who write until their
last breath that I myself could become one. In any
case, I shall only stop writing when I shall have written
an immortal work.
Q: Do you think that one recognizes it when one has
written it?
A: When one recognizes it one is truly an idiot.
Q: In general do you agree with your reviewers,
critics?
A: Rarely. I find them either too tolerant or too
harsh. Never in the middle. Especially in so far as Bonjour tristesse, they were much too tolerant. I was not so
dumb as to think that it was a masterpiece. I was only
seventeen, but I had read a great deal and I already
knew Proust.
Q: Can you explain what is particular about your
talents?
A: With difficulty. A kind of naturalness, I think. A
certain grace in writing, an inborn gift which makes
me find the adjective that goes with the noun, the
word that really expresses the idea. I am never
paralyzed by something because it is current. I always
think that the next idea will be better. There is, also,
in my writing, a mixture of arrogance and humility:
the arrogance is the certitude that I have grace in writing; the humility is that at the same time I am never
really sure of it and I try and do better in the next
sentence. Of course, I am not the only one to have a
certain grace of style, but I don't fuss about it. I have
a certain talent, but I don't make a system out of it.
And yet, I have never made the best of my talent. I
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could have done better.
Q: Do you have the feeling that your talent was
hampered by ... a certain laziness?
A: I work much, but I could have worked more.
Q: Your books sell all over the world. But if one day
they stopped selling, could you do anything else? Is
there any other profession you would like to exercise?
A: I have never done anything but write. I stopped
my formal education at seventeen, when Bonjour tristesse appeared. I kept on writing since, and my popularity remained intact. If I were no longer successful
I should like to be a psychiatrist since I exercise the
profession every day, with a lot of people, without getting paid .
Q: Are you under contract or is it you yourself who
decide when to write a book?
A: I, but more often my tax accountant.
Q: Are you always sure of being able to go on? Isn't
it scary to start a new novel?
A: I know I can always write a new novel. Especially
today since I just finished one and I like it and I feel
capable. But when I shall begin another I shall again
have doubts after the first sentence.
Q: Does it annoy you, that "certain music" of which
one speaks whenever one describes your style?
A: I got used to it. That "certain music" is the bittersweet tone. But in Un Sang d'aquarelle there is no
longer a "certain music," there is Wagner.
Q: Can we change the subject? You are a leftist. You
wrote many articles in defense of socialism, but your
work has no message; it has even been accused of
being futile.
A: Once I did write a political novel, Le Chien
couchant. The critics all said: "Why is she getting involved in all this?" I am accused of remaining in my
ivory tower, but when I get out they reproach me for
the fact that I do. It was safer in an ivory tower. Do
you recall that Lamartine was one of the greatest precursors of the 1848 revolution, yet he never wrote one
single political poem?
Q: The Sagan legend, is it still reality? That woman
who wastes money, runs around a great deal, lives at
night ...
A: Absolutely. In fact I always behaved just as they
said I did. There is no legend.
Q: You have a son, twenty-four years old. When he
was born you said something very beautiful: "I am like
a tree that has an extra branch."
A : It is exactly how I felt. And at the same time I
felt freer than ever. I felt total freedom.
Q: It is strange because in general the new responsibility imposes constraints.
A: No. One has only one responsibility: vis-a-vis
oneself. Above all to yourself be true, remember
The Cresset

Shakespeare?
Q: But you were living fast and dangerously. Your
son's birth did not make you slow down?
A: Maybe just barely, but not immediately. It is difficult to stop me. Or for me to stop. I might have if
I had had several children.
Q: It seems, however, that lately you did slow down.
A: You think so?
Q: You no longer drink . . .
A: It is not I who put the brakes on that; it is my
pancreas. If I drink I have pain. It is not willingly that
I stopped; it is because of fear.
Q: You no longer gamble in casinos ...
A: I do incognito and when I have the money. You
know, one is born a gambler as one is born blond or
brunette. I was born a gambler.
Q: All games, or just the casino kind?
A: All games. But especially those in a casino because they are more dramatic. And then, in the casino,
money once more becomes what it should be: tokens,
chips one throws in the air. I have the passion of
gambling in my blood.
Q: So uncontrollable that you are now refused permission to enter certain casinos?
A: For five years. What stupidity! I have to go play
in London, or in Monte Carlo. The traveling costs so
much money. I am beginning to pay my debts, but
when I hear the ding-cling of a one-arm bandit, I cannot resist. It is so difficult to interdict things to oneself. I cannot gamble, I cannot drink, what will be
next? Will I have to give up smoking?
Q: So that you have not changed?
A: Of course not. I put on certain pious airs so that
my bank won't worry, but my heart is not in it.
Q: But your piety seems to pay off. Now you are
even being invited to Mitterand's house .
A : Let's not talk about politics.
Q : Do you really have to make an effort to give
your banker, and the President, such a reassuring
image?
A: I do, since I have the same urges as I had at seventeen. But I know now that it is more practical to
wear a mask of reasonableness. I have a son who is
twenty-four, and it would be very annoying for him to
have a different kind of mother. And at my age, a
woman-child rouee is not a very esthetic personage.
Q: I find you very different from the image I had
of you. You seem rather sad.
A: I have humid, melancholic eyes, and they cause
people to pity me. My eyes provoke tenderness in
people and this is very practical. Having said that,
though, there are still many who cry on my shoulder
day and night.
Q: No doubt because you also have the reputation
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of a very generous woman.
A: I prefer to have this reputation rather than one
of a stingy person who holds on to her money.
Q: Do you contribute to charities as many stars do?
A: No. I am being solicited directly by individuals,
and I don't have the means to contribute to organized
charitable institutions.
Q: Recently you went to Colombia and to Poland.
Was it with a militant or humanitarian aim that you
made these trips?
A: I went to Bogota to see Bogota, as a tourist. I
went to Poland because I wanted to see Lech Walesa.
It's such fun to see him. Such natural, brute strength;
such shrewdness. Beautiful eyes, as those of a wild animal. I found Poland to be an incredible country.
Under occupation, with a resistance movement, and
with collabroators headed by Jaruzelski, that ferocious
Petain.
Q: If we could change the subject again . . . You
said once that one knows a writer when one discovers
his or her nostalgias. Which are yours?
A: I regret not having a slower life, a more harmonious one, more poetical. I dream of lying on a
huge bed, on a beach somewhere, with nothing to do.
Q: A dream of laziness?
A: Of paradise. Of lazy paradise, but one where
people do not have to work. It is humiliating to have
to work in order to earn a living. I work only because
I live in a society where everyone works. If I didn't I
would feel useless. But in a society in which people did
not work, I would refrain also. I would do nothing.
Q: You would not even write?
A: Some poetry. For pure pleasure. I never imagine
myself not writing. Not working, yes, very clearly.
Working to earn a living is a painful Christian alienation.
Q: Do you see yourself as an old woman, still bent
at your desk, writing?
A. I don't see myself as an old woman at all. I don't
see myself dying soon, and I have difficulty picturing
myself as old. Maybe because I was close to dying already several times.
Q: In 1957, after your auto accident [in Connecticut],
and recently when you had that car mishap in Bogota?
A: Yes, but also when I thought I had cancer of the
pancreas. I made my surgeon swear that he would not
wake me if he found incurable cancer. On the way to
the operating room I was praying that he not go back
on his word and try to treat me. I was so certain that
I was going to die.
Q: Please elaborate on your feelings about death.
A: They are so very banal. You tell yourself: "How
about that, the time has come? I would have thought
it would be much later." I felt as one does when an
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unwelcome guest arrives earlier than expected. And
then, you think of no one, neither family nor friends,
for you are alone and you tell yourself: "Nuts. Already?" Before the horror of it the body revolts, but
the mind says: "Oh well, there you are. How absurd!"
Q: And when you awaken still alive?
A: You exclaim: "Wow!"
Q : A "wow" that lasts, one that changes your way of
looking at life, or do you go on as if nothing happened?
A: I have never been able to determine how being
close to death changed my life. But I don't look at
death as do those who have never been near it. Having seen death limits its prestige. Did that change my
life, though? Maybe it made it more inconsequential,
more frivolous.
Q: You have often been accused of frivolity. In fact,
one imagines that you like being frivolous.
A: I find frivolity elegant. It is a place of refuge if
things go badly. After one has seen death close-up,
when a literary critic tears you apart, you don't take
it very seriously any more. You tell yourself: "There
are far more important t_h ings than that." Also, ft·ivolity is a way of being civilized, of respecting people by
not being presumptuous. Example: If I knew I had a
mortal disease now, 1 would not even tell those closest
to me.
Q: But you would want the doctors to tell you?
A: Of course. Not six months in advance, that's too
much ; two weeks before, that suffices. They should
tell you because it is enough that one lies to oneself.
When I thought I was dying I really never accepted
the idea. The spirit refuses. That's not lack of courage; the spirit must go on struggling.
Q: Do you think that your books might survive,
make you immortal?
A: I don't believe in survival in the libraries. But it
is funny that you should talk to me about it since I
have just been encouraged to become a candidate for
membership in the French Academy and join the Immortals. I refused. Because . . . because of many
reasons. First of all their uniform would not suit my
body, and then it is contrary to my ethics: honors disgust me a little. Yet, it is annoying because there are
enormous advantages in belonging to the French
Academy. You become rich for the rest of your life.
Even for a little preface you are paid a fortune. And
you are never put in prison. Do you know that there
has never been one imprisoned Academician? So there
are many advantages. Yet, I don't want to join. But
why were we talking about the Academy?
Q: It came up when we chatted about mortality.
A: Oh yes. You know, getting some letters telling
you that your books helped this or that reader, that's
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already satisfying enough. I get many such letters.
Even if the aim of the novel is not therapy, it is nice
to know that it can be.
Q: What is the aim of the novel?
A. To get as close as possible to the purity of art.

••
••

Poems with No Names:
The Sacred Pathway II
(After Lao Tzu)

4.
The square-cut log quiets the whole room
Where it stands on end
It is a lesson ; like Jerusalem
It is at peace with itself
It is restingThe origin of prayer
The foundation of order
In the world.
5.
The authentic one, the person of peace,
Is like the square-cut log,
A unity at rest
Never calling attention to himself.
The authentic one is always filled
With compassion. Like the abbot
In the desert he receives the cup of water
Whenever it is offered,
Even from an elder.
The authentic one's peace and compassion
Well up from within,
Are never required by virtue of morality
Or etiquette
Which, then , is no virtue.
The authentic one does not think about what
He does. Intuitively he drinks, and eats,
Walks and listens, leaves the flower on the stem
Sits in stillness and silence.

Travis DuPriest

The Cresset

Thomas A. Droege

FAITH DEVELOPMENT THEORY
A Review of Recent Developments

Over six years have passed since the publication of
Stages of Faith (San Francisco, 1981) by James Fowler.
Though he and others had written articles and published modest volumes on faith development prior to
1981 (e.g. Life-Maps by J. Fowler and S. Keen), it was
the publication of Stages of Faith which established the
theory of faith development as an important field of
theological inquiry in the 1980s and beyond. It is the
purpose of this essay to make a critical assessment of
faith development studies since that time and briefly
comment on their implications for the church's life
and ministry.
Development is a modern concept that has proved
to be of enormous heuristic value for all the humanistic disciplines. It was only a matter of time until the
idea of development would affect the way Christians
think about faith. Faith, of course, is not easily defined. It has always had both an objective and subjective meaning. Faith can mean "what" is believed (e.g.,
"the Christian faith"), but it can also refer to "how" a
person believes (e.g., "trusting Jesus"). Faith development theory focuses on the subjective side of faith,
what Fowler calls the structure as distinguished from
the content of faith. It is obvious that "how" a person
believes changes over time, and thus we have different
educational materials for first graders than we do for
adults, but it is only recently that serious studies have
begun to chart the stages of this development and
explore the implications for Christian education, pastoral care, evangelism, and many other practical and
theoretical concerns.
Fowler's book made such an impact at the level of
both theory and practice not only because there was
readiness for the idea of faith development within
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contemporary culture but also because his theory was
based on solid empirical studies that he and others
had been engaged in at Harvard University and later
at the Center for Faith Development Studies which
Fowler established at Emory University and still heads.
Fowler defines faith as a relationship of trust and loyalty to centers of value and power, a definition similar
to that of Paul Tillich and H. Richard Niebuhr, both
of whom understood faith to be a human universal relating the individual to what is ultimate in his or her
life. Fowler's approach is unique in that he traces the
patterns and passages of faith throughout the life
cycle. He charts the process of development on the
basis of interviews which he and his colleagues conducted with individuals (both Christian and non-Christian) at different ages and from different stations in
life.

Fowler defines faith as a relationship
of trust and loyalty to centers of
value and power, a definition similar
to that of Paul Tillich and
H. Richard Niebuhr, both of whom
saw faith as a human universal.
Fowler distinguished six different stages of faith
from the interview material, each having its place
within a sequential order that is invariant. Each new
stage builds on and incorporates into its more elaborate pattern the operations of the previous stage. Thus
development is always in the direction of greater complexity and flexibility. Fowler acknowledges his debt to
Piaget's theory of cognitive development and Kohlberg's theory of moral development. He understands
faith to include forms of logic and moral judgment
but also additional aspects of meaning-making by individuals, such as perspective taking and the form ing of
symbols.
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Though Fowler goes beyond the more limited cognitive structures that Piaget and Kohlberg examined, he
still belongs to the family of theorists called structuralists (positing cognitive structures) or constructivists (the mind constructing reality rather than simply
perceiving it). The key idea in this approach is that all
knowing is interactional. The mind is never simply the
passive recipient of an incoming stimulus, be that a
football game or a revelatory event; there are evolving
structures for making meaning, including the meaning
of faith.

Psychotherapists generally have been
critical of faith development theory
for being too rational and not
attentive enough to psychodynamic
factors that operate largely in
the realm of the unconscious.
A detailed description of the six stages of faith can
be found in Chapter 5 of Stages of Faith, as well as in
other writings of and about Fowler. Primal Faith (Stage
0) begins with a prelanguage disposition of trust and
loyalty toward the environment which forms in the
rituals of relationship with those providing care. Intuitive-Projective Faith (Stage 1), lacking stable logical operations and the ability to differentiate and coordinate
one's own perspective from and with others, gives free
reign to the imagination and gives to the child's experience an episodic character. Mythic-Literal Faith
(Stage 2) can make use of symbols and concepts, but
remains largely concrete and literal. It most frequently
constructs an ultimate environment on the analogy of
a consistent, caring, but just ruler or parent. In the effort to gather its meanings, story is as close as it comes
to reflective synthesis. Synthetic-Conventional Faith
(Stage 3) emerges generally in early adolescence when
worth is heavily keyed to the approval of significant
others, including God, who from this stage onward is
conceived in personal terms. Authority resides outside
oneself. A person at this stage says, "I believe what the
church believes." lndividuative-Reflective Faith (Stage 4)
shifts from a tacit system of beliefs to a more explicit
meaning system subject to critical examination. This
can be a period of doubt and soul-searching as symbols rich in mystery are "flattened out" in order to get
clear and explicit conceptual formulations. The focus
of faith's authority shifts from outside to inside the
self. Conjunctive Faith (Stage 5) arises with an awakening to polar tensions within oneself and to paradox in
the nature of truth. It seeks to unify seeming oppo-
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sites in mind and experience. Though faith at this
stage knows that symbols can be reduced to abstract
meanings, it develops a second or willed naivete that
can appreciate a depth and power in symbols as never
before. Universalizing Faith (Stage 6) brings an identification with or participation in the Ultimate. One begins to love and value from a centering located in the
Ultimate. Though rarely attained Qesus, Martin
Luther King, and Mother Theresa are examples), it is
the goal toward which all faith intuitively moves.
A recent critical review of Fowler's faith development theory bears the appropriate title of Faith Development and Fowler (Birmingham, Ala., 1986). I
strongly recommend this book to anyone seriously interested in the subject. The book is a collection of essays written by theorists in a wide variety of fields who
engage in critical conversations with Fowler on the
strengths and weaknesses of his theory, as well as the
implications of its "practical" uses.
The opening chapter on "Faith and the Structuring
of Meaning" by Fowler is an updated essay first published in 1980. Here Fowler provides a clear and concise introduction to the major dimensions and insights
of his theory. The next section of the book offers a
number of evaluations of faith development theory,
the best of them by Craig Dykstra, who questions
whether faith is really a human universal or rather a
mode of life that is grounded in a more or less conscious and chosen responsiveness to the activity of God
in the world. The latter definition, which comes closer
to the way most people would define faith, suggests a
very different pattern of growth in faith than that of
Fowler.
Part Ill of the book has to do with enhancing faith
development theory. In an excellent essay, Sharon
Parks argues that faith development theory would be
enhanced by a more thorough understanding of the
nature of the imagination and its relation to the
human spirit and the Spirit of God, an idea that we
will explore more fully below in examining her book
on The C~tical Years. She suggests that by examining
the role of imagination we can overcome the problem
of the relationship between structure and content that
cognitive-structural theories have difficulty addressing.
Part IV of the book explores the relation of faith
development theory to ministry. The best of these essays is by Carl Schneider: "Faith Development and
Pastoral Diagnosis." Schneider's critique of Fowler's
theory comes at it from the viewpoint of pastoral
psychotherapy. Therapists generally have been critical
of faith development theory for being too rational and
not attentive enough to psychodynamic factors that
operate largely in the realm of the unconscious.
Schneider approaches Fowler from the perspective of
The Cresset

object-relations theory, a major school of psychology
that is now of special interest among pastoral
psychologists. Faith Development and Fowler concludes
with a response by Fowler to the essays included in
this volume. In his response Fowler is remarkably
open, generous to his critics, and clear in differentiating his position from that of others.

Some participants in a recent research
project objected to the definition of
faith as the making of meaning.
First, there is no mention of God,
probably because the definition is
derived from Tillich-Niebuhr-Fowler.
Current interest in faith development theory has
moved in the direction of adult development. This is
true of developmental theory generally. A number of
studies in adult development in the past decade have
sparked this interest. The most influential of these
studies is The Seasons of a Man's Life (New York, 1978)
by Daniel Levinson, an in-depth longitudinal study of
forty adult men. Studies in adult development can
generally be grouped under what has been classified
as life cycle theory, the father of which is Erik Erikson
and his well-known delineation of "eight ages of man."
The central idea in this approach is that there are
psychosocial stages that persons go through, ready or
not (e.g., adolescence), and some rather clearly defined transitions (e.g., mid-life crisis) that can be anticipated in any person's life. This is a rather different
approach to human development than the structuraldevelopmental approach of Piaget and Kohlberg that
so deeply influenced Fowler's faith development
theory.
Fowler's recent book on adult development and
Christian faith, Becoming Adult, Becoming Christian (New
York, 1984) shows the influence of life cycle theory
much more than did Stages of Faith. Erikson, Levinson,
and Carol Gilligan's feminist interpretation of development come into play along with Fowler's own faith development theory. The key theological terms in
Fowler's analysis are vocation and covenant, understood as ideals of Christian selfhood and contrasted to
the popular ideal of self-actualization. The strength of
his analysis lies in his exposure of the self-grounded
"evolving life structures" that are so prevalent in the
case histories of Levinson's study and in the alternative
he offers of adult faith development grounded in the
purposes of God.
Fowler's book on adult faith development is well
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done, and I commend it to the reader, but the most
significant research on adult faith development in this
decade has been conducted by the Religious Education
Association. Between 1981 and 1986, the Faith Development in the Adult Life Cycle Project, sponsored
by the REA, studied a variety of factors relating the
processes of aging and faith development among
adults. This extensive research involved well over
1,000 persons in North America and produced findings that have many implications for various forms of
ministry in the church. The report of this research
project has recently been published Qune, 1987)
under the title Faith Development in the Adult Life Cycle.
This report is not to be confused with a book by the
same title that was published in 1983 (Sadlier) and
edited by Kenneth Stokes, the over-all project director.
That book was generated at the early stages of the research project and contains essays by a wide variety of
people who were assisting the research staff in
generating appropriate hypotheses for tes!ing.
The REA research project worked with the following definition of faith: "the finding and making meaning of life's significant questions and issues, adhering
to this meaning, and acting it out." The core of this
perspective is that faith is the making of meaning.
Some participants in the research objected to that definition. First, there is no mention of God, probably because the definition is derived from Tillich-NiebuhrFowler. Second, the definition is not that which most
adults would choose, a point borne out by the research
itself. In one of the multiple choice survey questions,
51 per cent of the respondents defined faith as "a relationship with God" and only 20 per cent chose "finding meaning in life."
The research used two complementary research designs to gather data, one a large statistically valid Gallup sample, and another in-depth, face-to-face exploration of deeper meanings. The major findings of the
research are as follows:
1. Maturity in faith is related to resolving psychosocial
tensions in marriage, job, etc. Psychological and
spiritual health are closely related.
2. The period of early middle-age (35-45) is the time
of the greatest struggle with resolutions to life-cycle
tensions and is likely to be the most critical time for
adult faith development.
3. Men and women experience the faith journey differently. Women reflect on and find fuller dimensions of meaning in experiences they associate with
their faith journey and tend to share faith attitudes
with others more than men. Men tend to be more
traditional in their faith statements.
4. Involvement and participation in a religious community is not by itself a determining factor in one's
19

growth in faith un less that community helps to
"sponsor" or encourage one's spiritual quest.
5. Crisis experiences, both positive and negative, appear to be the major factor in the stimu lation of faith
development. Most change in an individual's faith
takes place at times of li fe transitions.
6. Two out of three persons believe that faith shou ld
change throughout life, although fewer church
members than non-members hold this view.
7. Higher education leads to more openness to faith
change, and also to a weakening of traditional faith
orientations. Many regard this as having "less faith"
rather than "more faith," a finding that appears to
be related to the previous point that church members often feel that faith should not change.
8. Involvement with social issues and concerns appears to enhance faith development.
9. A balance between the "cognitive" and "affective"
dimensions of one's faith development is highly important for a fully integrated and functional faith .
10. Non-traditional forms of education often lead to
greater maturity in one's faith development.
The research report on Faith Development in the Adult
Life Cycle is well worth the purchase of a copy. It provides an overview of the entire study, a description of
the methodology used, a summary of the findings ,
theological reflection on the findings, implications for
ministry, as well as scholarly documentation of the
project's two research designs . The material in this report should guide programs in Christian education,
pastoral care, and outreach ministry for many years to
come.
Of all the recent publications in fa ith development
theory, the one that I find most exciting is Sharon
Parks' The Critical Years: The Young Adult SeaTCh for a
Faith to Live By (San Francisco, 1986). One reason for
my particular interest in this volume is that it helps me
as a college professor to better understand the process
of faith development in the college years. But I think
I would be excited by this book even if it weren't my
task to nurture the faith of college students. Parks
provides the clearest and freshest description of faith
as meaning-making that I have seen. The book is aptly
named ; the college years are the critica l years for making meaning. Put within the framewor k of the Lutheran tradition, the college years are the time when
a student moves from a confirmation faith that has
been given by the community to the composing of a
faith that fits with his or her emerging understanding
of self and world.
Parks charts the journey toward mature adult faith
by providing a model for understanding that journey
that is clearly diagrammed and easy to follow. One of
her unique contributions to faith development theory

20

is that she discerns a stage of development between
adolescence and adulthood, the stage of the young
adu lt. This stage is characterized by a form of cognition that she calls "probing commitment," a form of
dependence that she defines as "fragile inner-dependence," and a form of community that she calls an
"ideological compatible group." T hese are apt descriptions of the provisional self that is in the process of
transition from being a person whose identity is defined by external authorities and the secure person
who knows who s/he is within a community of adults.
Her description of young adult faith is must reading
for college professors, campus pastors, parents of children in college, thoughtful adults who would like to
reflect on where they've been, and perhaps even some
perceptive college students, though most of the latter
are likely to be so deeply embedded in the process that
they will be unable to get enough distance on it to use
Parks' analysis for self-understanding.

Of all the recent publications in
faith development theory, the one I
find most exciting is Sharon Parks'

The Critical Years: The Young Adult
Search for a Faith to Live By.
Parks makes another striking contribution to faith
development theory in her chapter on "Imagination."
Fowler's faith development theory makes a sharp split
between the structure and content of faith, the "how"
and the "what" of faith. Though acknowledging the
importance of the content of fa ith , he devotes almost
all of his attention to the structures of cognition, dependence on authority, forms of community, etc., that
are at work in forming the content of faith. Parks
shows the power of the imagination at work in the formation of adult faith. As she states : "We must recognize that the function of structures is to hold life in
meaningful patterns and that . .. life's patterns are
given form, not only by the structures already described, but also by the images the structures hold ."
Parks offers a corrective to this "neglect" in the
Piagetian paradigm with a description of critical "moments" in the process of imagination as these bear on
human development: (1) conscious conflict (something
not fitting), (2) pause (or interlude for scan ning), (3)
image (or insight) , (4) repatterning and release of
energy, and (5) interpretation. These elements are
borrowed from James Loder's oft-quoted analysis of
The Transforming Moment (New York, 1981) . The use
of these elements to describe both the role of imaginaThe Cresset

tion in faith development and the task of higher education as a "community of imagination" is carefully
and thoughtfully done.
Parks understands faith development to be the task
of all those engaged in higher education, not just campus pastors and theology professors. Though most of
my colleagues would accuse her of a bit of hyperbole
in describing "the professor as spiritual guide" and
"the syllabus as a confession of faith," at least one college has taken this with full seriousness. Under the direction of J. Paul Ballas, Thiel College has engaged in
a complete rethinking and restructuring of its entire
educational program under the rubric of faith development. A full report of this venture will soon be
published under the title, A Handbook on Faith, Development, and the Lutheran Church College. It will deserve
careful study by all those engaged in higher education,
but especially by church-related schools which see faith
development as one of their primary objectives.
There is another approach to faith development
which I can only mention in passing. This approach
grows out of the application of psychoanalytic objectrelations theory to an understanding of faith formation . Anna Marie Rizzuto has written a fascinating account of the Birth of the Living God (Chicago, 1979) in
which she argues convincingly for very early formation
of images of God that grow out of relationship to parents. Rizzuto is a psychoanalyst and writes from that
perspective. John McDargh places this approach
within a theological frame of reference in his book on
Psychoanalytic Object Relations Theory and the Study of
Religion: On Faith and the Imaging of God (Lanham,
Md., 1983). The strength of this approach resides not
only in providing a perspective for viewing the earliest
stages of faith formation , but also in offering a corrective to the heavily rational approach of the structuralists on whom Fowler is so dependent. Carl
Schneider's essay in Faith Development and Fowler, referred to earlier, makes that point convincingly.
Within the last decade faith development theory has
clearly established itself as an area of theological study
that will continue to attract scholars for years to come.
Though sufficient empirical research has been done
by the REA and the Center for Faith Development to
establish the validity of faith development theory,
much remains to be done in testing new hypotheses
(e.g., Parks' positing of a new stage). Specialists in
Christian education, pastoral care, and evangelism
should find much in faith development theory for reflecting on ministries in these areas .
One of the greatest challenges that awaits an enterprising scholar in the future is to attempt an integration of the various "schools" of faith development
theory: structural, life cycle, and object relations.
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Robert Kegan has gone a long way toward this goal
from the psychological side with his superb book on
The Evolving Self (Cambridge, Mass., 1982). A similar
study of "evolving faith" that would have both the
breadth and depth of Kegan's analysis is something
devoutly to be desired as faith development theory
matures in the years ahead.

C:

First light
In the first light it happens,
when the place starts up
with sounds and smells of coffee
somewhere,
and a new dog barking
where before was silence
Then small things gouge
the spirit,
when the eyelids are closed,
hands still folded on your breast,
knowing where you are
by the stillness of the room.
Here is where it begins;
the first moves toward life,
reaching down, past faces,
past parts of lives still clinging
to your lazarus spirit,
folding back the long shadows .
that rise and fall
in diaphanous waves on the inside
of your eyes
where night sounds slide
on mossy stones and foxes
move in light from bark and stone.
Then a bird's clear insistent song
weaves a scarlet thread through
the deep-throated chapel bells;
your eyes open,
and drawn upward from the cool shades
of sleep,
Christ on the white-washed wall
becomes your morning prayer
and birth-breath.

J. T. Ledbetter
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Interrogation?
Charles Vandersee
Taking a walk in Portland late
one afternoon, down the street and
through a spacious hillside cemetery, I came upon three or four
people picking wild Oregon blackberries.
I stopped to pick a few myself.
They were perfectly ripe, yielding
at the merest touch, and very tasty,
like the famous plums in William
Carlos Williams' poem-the ones I
ate that you were probabl y saving
for breakfast ("Forgive me I they
were delicious I so sweet I and so
cold"). It was Sunday. I took a
handful back to the house, where
the people were glad I was pleased
but seemed not impressed.
These wild Oregon blackberries
appeared again a few days later,
between Ashland and the Pacific
coast. Along the Umpqua River was
a large roadside park, and again
only a few people were picking the
lush ripe berries. Most of them, it
appeared, were going to go unpicked. They turned up again that
night, where the yard of the motel
in Astoria overlooked the Columbia
River.
Next day I mentioned these little
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juicy pleasures to the woman in the
information booth at the Astoria
Column, a landmark overlooking
Lewis and Clark country. "Oh,
those pests! " she replied , with matronly condescension, "They take
over everything!"
Wild blackberries, it turns out,
are no luxury in August in Oregon.
Any more than forsythia and
azaleas in Dogwood in April. My
discovery was merely personal ;
everybody else knew about these
berries. Furthermore, the natives
knew their value.
There must be a sort of anthropologist in most of us. In a
new place, that is, looking about
and discovering what's there, but
then going on to find out the truth
that doesn't yield itself at a glance.
And enjoying that disruptive truth.
I remember knowing, in the
1960s, before driving into Los
Angeles for the first time, that the
city was part of the great Southwest
desert.
But
throughout
Westwood Village were these immaculate green lawns! At the
Tudor house where I had rented a
room , I got out of the car and
looked. The lawn was being watered not by a green Midwestern
hose but by a buried network of
pipes, with outlets all over the
lawn. The desert was not a desert! felt as amazed as Lewis and
Clark, or Keats' Cortez, seeing the
Pacific.
Consider also, only a few weeks
ago, our Sunday morning church
class. Perversely, the leaders use
earnest topical books produced by
church publishing houses. These
books guide lay people from text to
selected text in the Bible, enabling
us to "discover for ourselves" certain patterns in the mind of God,
which He has hidden among vast
stretches of desertlike, unteachable
material.
Perversely, while the Sunday discussion plodded toward its predestined discoveries, I snuck a look at

adjacent passages. We were doing
man's disobediences. What I personally discovered, in Genesis 6, in
a passage not assigned, was that
God, about the time of Noah, had
grown disgusted not only with men
and women. He was also furious
with the birds. Also with cattle and
the creeping things. This I had
never known. But none of the natives was around to ask, so I missed
the pleasure of disruption. What
had the birds done?
These are such little things, the
epiphanies of travels and texts, important merely for making us want
to keep on living. A satisfactory
epiphany is a discovery surprising
in itself but then leading on, by investigation, to a disruption that enhances the pleasure. The blackberries were delicious, but the pleasure
was agreeably disrupted by learning that the natives despised them.

Perversely, while the
Sunday discussion plodded
toward its predestined
discoveries, I snuck a
look at adjacent
passages. We were doing
man's disobediences.

Consider what happened in a
class last fall. When we read Emily
Dickinson I was surprised by a discovery m a poem I've read dozens
of times:
After great pain, a formal feeling comes.
The Nerves sit ceremonious, like TombsThe stiff Heart questions was it He, that bore,
And Yesterday, or Centuries before?

The pleasure was suspicion: I
wagered to myself that the critics
were going to differ as they discussed "He." So the poem would
nicely illustrate for the class the
problem , often in Dickinson, in
reaching closure and consensus.
The Cresset

Possibly we have here what
theorists call "indeterminacy," arising from instability in our language. But it's more satisfactory to
tell undergraduate students that we
have a case of "intelligent readers
disagreeing," out of ignorance, or
failure to pay attention, or perverse
ingenuity, or maybe the instability of
language.

Now this lengthy
illustration merely
betrays the eccentric
passions of an English
teacher. I admit it.
Also, not everybody
enjoys blackberries.
Well, the premomuon was right.
A fairly recent book on Dickinson
told me that "He" was a sort of
other self. The heart that questions
is standing outside itself and trying
to get distance on that self by putting itself in third person: Am I the
one who has been bearing this
pain? And it seems so long, but
how long is it? "He" is the heart itself. Another book on Dickinson
said something similar: The stiff
Heart has "a sense of wonder at its
own former agony."
But an older book, the first edition of Understanding Poetry, by
Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn
Warren, brought in a different
conclusion: "The heart, obsessed
with pain and having lost the sense
of time and place, asks whether it
was Christ who bore the cross."
So here was the next step after
discovery: the pleasurable "disruption." Indeed, a bit more disruption than I expected. I had expected disagreement as to whether
"He" was Christ, but I expected
that every critic would offer Christ
as at least a possibility. It would be
just like Dickinson the skeptic to
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wonder whether any kind of strong
Savior did indeed bear the cross, or
griefs, or sorrows. If so, why were
they still around?
Now this lengthy illustration
merely betrays the eccentric passions of an English teacher. I admit
it. Also, not everybody enjoys
blackberries. What can I say?
What I've been intending to say
is that some sort of pattern is
operating here. A two-stage sequence of experience, discovery
and disruption. What would a third
element be?
Following discovery and disruption might well be persistent interrogation, until reaching a sort of
foundation. What if in Oregon
these random natives are not only
right but wrong? Suppose it turns
out that certain other natives are
harvesting great quantities of blackberries, mixing them with pectin
and sugar, and marketing them
across the nation as Genuine Oregon Wild Blackberry Preserves?
Available in your gourmet food
section.
That is, a foundation truth about
wild blackberries could be not only
their intrinsic goodness and their
territorial aggression, but their contribution to the economy of the

state.
As for Genesis, suppose that
most of the commentaries agree.
Perhaps in Hebrew tradition the
corruption of human beings is understood as necessarily defiling nature. (As suggests the Interpreter's
Commentary, while Wycliffe ignores.)
There is the fascinating and disruptive information that enhances
my discovery. What I need now is
the foundation I perhaps cannot
get: the reason the Genesis writer
chooses birds, of all things, for
making his point. Is it poetry? Is
there purpose here, lost and arcane?
As for Dickinson, what if, out of
100 commentators on the poem, 90
do see Christ? My luck is to find
two, in a random investigation, who
have not plunged deeply enough.
The foundation would be that Dickinson is not as indeterminate as she
may seem.
A satisfaction of this little pattern
is the way it helps me think about
how the mind approaches the bottom of things, the place for a
foundation. Involved in education,
I think about this every now and
then, especially in pondering the
failures in American education addressed by such recent critics as
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Allan Bloom, E. D. Hirsch, Diane
Ravitch, and Theodore Sizer.
T he bottom seems to be what we
need , but the superficial discovery
is fascinating, and the disruption
that may follow the discovery is
very often so appealing that the
mind happily rests there. As, I confess , my own mind often does,
especially in a lower-division undergraduate class, which is where we
were reading about pain.
At the moment, all I want to do
is connect this spurious repose with
the conventional lexicon that we
use without thinking. The term
"education" applies to all the official stages of a person's mental
growth: elementary education, secondary education, higher education, postgraduate and professional
education, continuing education.
As if at all levels essentially the
same thing goes on, which seems to
me not the case.
Maybe we need to alter the lexicon. Let "elementary" education be
called schooling, implying the common place, the school building,
where the young and ignorant repair, as to an old- fashioned gas station , for filling and for little kind
serviCes.
Let "secondary" education drop
that indeterminate adjective and be
called simply education, according to
the conventional (some say spurious) etymology of the word, the
"drawing out" or "leading forth " of
what's within; that is , emphasis on
both critical and creative powers
once a certain fund of information
has become present, and also certain skills, linguistic and arithmetical.
Then, for "higher education" an
emphasis on what I have been talking about: interrogation. The process
by which the mind pushes down
farther into both fact and significance, until at or beyond what is
hitherto known. Bedrock. As it is,
"higher" education may, unfortunately, connote ascent-into abstrac24

tion, into ivory towers-whereas
"interrogation" is necessarily a descent, a plun ging, a mining or excavating expedition.
I have no term at hand for postgraduate or professional education,
since postgrad uate education seems
to me a continuation of interrogation. And professional education
varies from profession to profession, emphasizing both skills and
knowledge in ways that make it
something like schooling, but transposed to a different key.

Does it matter what we
call things? Does one
word rather than another,
ten thousand times
a year in the media,
affect our analysis
of current problems?
All this may be merely whimsical.
Does it matter what we call things?
Does one word rather than
another, ten thousand times a year
in the media, affect our analysis of
current problems?
Again, you have the English
teacher before you-a fellow who
bristles whenever local educators
get quoted in the Dogwood Daily
Progress about the "youngsters"
they deal with. I dislike this word
intensely; it sounds as if children
K-12 are predestined to remain diminutive : ignorant and irresponsible beings, instead of being led by
schools into adulth ood through imitation of adu lthood. The old term
connoting such mimesis is "pupils";
one of its dictionary meanings actually is "disciples." I would gladly
welcome "pupils" back into public
discourse.
So that I'm curious whether public discourse on colleges and universities would focus and improve
if we kept reading and hearing

about interrogation. College preparation thus becomes "getting ready to
go away to interrogation." College
itself is , more than anything else,
inquiring. Asking across the curriculum . Students are understood to
come to college to use question
marks, more than to marvel, to
rest, to recite, to "expose themselves." The name of the game is
Foundation.
We would be dealing with our
spurious ease. We know how easily
we rest at beginnings, with the
pleasures of the senses. And how
we also rest comfortably at halfway
points, the pleasurable disruption
that new information provides. A
fine passage of Keats , in a letter,
comically affirms the senses:
Talking of pleasure, this moment I
was writing with one hand , and
with the other holding to my
mouth a Nectarine-good God
how fine. It went down soft,
slushy, oozy-all its delicious embonpoint [plumpness] melted down
my throat like a beatified Strawberry.
For "youngsters ," the pleasurable
thing about Keats is the plumpness
of his poems, his sensuous language, almost making things palpable. A "pupil" of the same age
might ask how long it took Keats to
develop such language ; well before
he died at age 25, would be the disruptive and fascinating answer to
rest with.
An "interrogator," moving on
beyond language and biography,
would then ask how such precocity
develops, and be led to the foundation of the matter-the answer
being interrogation itself. Well before his premature death this
youngster had for years been brilliantly interrogating Shakespeare,
Milton, and Wordsworth about language, thought, art, and imagination .
From Dogwood, yours faithfully,
C.V.

C:

The Cresset

Privatization
Paul H. Brietzke
Many of us get more conservative as we grow older, if only because we seek to conserve something from our past that seems better than what we have now. For
me, that better past was the late
1960s. We fought over Vietnam,
the War on Poverty, and many
other things ; almost everyone regarded public affairs as matters for
public concern.
In the years that followed , most
hippies all too quickly abandoned
an apparently superficial commitment to "community." They became yuppies who got "into"
Ronald Reagan and private consumption. The Reagan Administration can claim few noteworthy and
lasting achievements, but historians
are likely to remember this Administration for a massive transfer of
public confidence and other more
tangible resources from the public
sector. (I assume that defense contractors like General Dynamics and
Lockheed still fall into the private
sector, and that our Persian Gulf
policy should be made by the President and State Department rather
than by Standard Oil.)
I was set to thinking about the
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privatization of our public life by a
remarkable book-A History of Private Life: I . From Pagan Rome to
Byzantium
(Harvard
University
Press, 1987). This book is very expensive, probably because of the
many enjoyable but usually irrelevant illustrations, so read it on interlibrary loan if you can (a good
'60's-style tactic, that). Seeking to
make Pagan Rome come alive for
his readers, Paul Veyne contrasts
behavior there with the "modern
view" that public service is corrupted when personal ambition is
placed above the common good.
Veyne neglects the most modern
view, that a stimulated private ambition most efficiently serves our
common good; we are quickly becoming more Roman than the Romans. Most of our public functions
may thus become Roman rackets,
requiring that an official quickly
deliver the goods to his or her
single-interest clients or be driven
from office.
As is increasingly the case with
us , public dignity was a private
property in Rome. An official's
"credibility" was everything to him,
and being credible is a very different thing from telling the truth or
even being right. Gravity of gesture
and language were indicia of authority, and the equivalent of our
media consultants and P.R. people
coached officials, much as candidates and toilet paper are packaged
today for private consumption.
Bread and Circuses were used to
seize the limelight in Rome. Today,
the media control the limelight on
less Bread and more Circuses: the
Statue of Liberty and the Constitution, Jim and Tammy Faye, Contragate and Bork confirmation
hearings, and the Pope's visittriumphs of form over substance.
Roman civic virtues came to include ostentation and a disdain for
the poor who were, and now increasingly are, thought to be morally inferior to the beautiful people

(Seneca) who have the leisure for
civic duties. "The Gods" formed a
private religion that impartially
guaranteed interests that wished to
appear disinterested; Roman Gods
patriotically rewarded your and
your nation's friends, and enemies
were
punished-with
plagues
rather than with AIDS.
We know what happened to the
Romans, but the means of governance among the "barbarians," the
ancestors of many of us, are less
well known . They are detailed in a
History chapter by Michel Rouche.
In fifth-century Gaul, wealth became a purely private matter, and
there were attempts to make everything private, especially homes.
The same thing-"cocooning"-is
happening among us, but absent a
broad legal right to it, this privacy
will belong only to the r ich.
Privatizers (privateers?) like Robert
Bork would deny us this legal right
because (among other reasons) privacy can then become what
economists call a status good; fl ying
to a Swiss clinic for your abortion
or stationing a guard in the foyer
of your condo costs a great deal of
money. Bork got hoist with his own
petard as, absent a privacy right,
his videotape rental records were
exposed to public view. Such records are as revealing of a yup pie's
"lifestyle" as are his income tax returns.

We know what happened
to the Romans, but the
means of governance
among the "barbarians"
are less well known.
The Germanic ongms of power
were magical, divine, and military,
with the king condemned to conquer in order to maintain his authority. Reagan comes across like a
modern-day German princeling, a
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Gott mit uns magician from the
Silver Screen who keeps his troops
happy, not with the booty of war
but with the pork barrel of the Defense Department. "Strangers" are
more or less synonymous with
"enemies," Nicaraguans for example, because we have not shared a
banquet with them. Among the
Merovingians
and
increasingly
among ourselves, the total confusion of public and private and an
inability to rise above strictly personal and concrete realities foster
an inability to even conceive of the
common good.
Of course, history does not repeat itself event-for-event. The
purpose of my historical conceit is
to temper the conceit we may feel
in the inevitability of progress in
Robert
America.
Articles
by
Lekachman and Karl Freiden , in
the Summer 1987 Dissent, attack
our expansionist conceit over
privatization. We should at least be
aware of the fact that profit-making schools, hospitals, research centers, job-training programs, and
prisons are rapidly displacing public, or at least non-profit, institutions. There may soon come a time
when corporate America will fulfill
all of the needs that it chooses to
fulfill and that some of us can pay
for as individuals. We can then say
that "America is back," to private
and public charity akin to those of
the Victorian or Dickensian eras.
The argument put by Bork and
other Chicago School gurus is that
privatization widens "consumer"
choice, while saving money by substituting marketplace disciplines for
bureaucratic rigidities. Americans
are apparently willing to buy into
these arguments. Gallup and Roper
polls cited by Freiden show that
more than 80 per cent of Americans believe the public sector to be
less efficient than the private sector, and that government employees are less diligent than their corporate counterparts. The median
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estimate of how much government
spending is wasted approaches 50
per cent. People presumably think
about public inefficiency while paying far too much for gas to put
into their made-in-Detroit guzzlers.

In our free-enterprise
economy, government gets
to produce and sell only
what is left after
corporations and private
consumers have picked
over the opportunities.
Freiden is right to attribute these
public attitudes to ignorance and
misunderstanding. In a privateenterprise economy like ours, government gets to produce and sell
only what is left after corporations
and individual consumers have
picked over the opportunities. Most
government products are, like education , consumer regulations, and
police protection , unsuitable for
assembly-line
mass
production.
Most of them are also unsuitable
for marketplace exchanges; B-1
bombers, Yellowstone Park, and
clean air are not sold like Chryslers. Where the public and private
sectors overlap in the marketplace,
government invariably caters to the
less affluent households. Such
households are unattractive to corporations and to the affluent generally, as standing reproaches to
our entire system.
Private consumption can be satisfying, if you plan expenditures well
and reckon that you got what you
paid for. But collective consumption is always unsatisfyingly divisive
because, through taxes, you have to
pay for what you do not want as
well as what you want. I am opposed to Star Wars, but I have to
pay for it anyway; if we funded the
system by passing the hat among
dedicated Star Warriors, its costs

would come nowhere near to being
covered. People seldom know what
they are getting in the form of
public goods and services. Apart
from the Defense Department, government spends little on advertising. If people were made to want
good schools as much as they are
made to want Chicken McNuggets
and Star Wars, our consumption
patterns would begin to change.
The public sector operates in a
fishbowl, as it should, but the private sector is relatively immune to
cnuosm. ews of Contragate and
of the equally juicy insider trading
scandals on Wall Street broke at
about the same time, yet the latter
scandals received much less media
attention. So long as accountants
can make a corporation appear to
be profitable, even its shareholders
are unlikely to complain. Our
values have become so distorted
that predatory images of business,
of greed and callous self-interest,
reinforce its reputation for efficiency.
This reputation does not survive
a hard look at the evidence.
Lekachman notes that inpatient
bills from for-profit hospital chains
(e.g., Humana) were 24 per cent
higher than for non-profit hospitals
in California (11 per cent higher in
Florida). The for-profits even had
4 per cent higher costs in Florida.
So much for private-sector efficiency, when the for-profit hospitals can "cream off' patients (consign difficult people and ailments
to public hospitals) and can improve "productivity" by increasing
to barbarous heights the ratio of
patients to nurses and residents.
In contrast, public hospitals do
more research and teaching, offer
a broader range of health care services, and provide more philanthropic care. Where is all the
money in for-profit hospitals
going? To shareholders, to senior
executives who have M.B.A.s rather
than M.D.s, and to inefficiency. If
The Cresset

present trends continue, more of
the indigent, elderly, and chronically ill will get more of the kind of
care Americans apparently believe
they deserve.

Private prisons would
presumably have no
incentive to reduce
overcrowding or improve
minimal conditions.
The just-deserts perspective is
even more interesting in the forprofit prison movement. If we
don't care about sick people, how
much less do we care about prisoners? Private prisons would presumably have no incentive to reduce
overcrowding or to improve conditions beyond the minima required
under an inevitably loose state
supervision. We would be lucky if
these places became no worse than
Victorian
workhouses.
Some
analysts are apparently advising
their clients that for-profit prisons
are the best possible investment.
(Remember that you read it in The
Cresset first, and reward your editor
accordingly.)
In a May 1987 Vanderbilt Law R eview article, Ira Robbins notes that
there are only some thirty forprofit prison facilities in the U.S. so
far, many of them for juveniles or
illegal immigrants and none for
adults thought to require medium
or maximum security. Because forprofit prisons are so new, Robbins
must ask many more questions
than he can answer. The most important one is: What happens to
the prisoner's constitutional rights,
the protection of which the State,
having put him or her in jail, presumably cannot delegate to a corporation? What happens when private warders believe they must use
potentially deadly force or go out
on strike? What happens if the forJanuary, 1988

profit prison declares bankruptcy
after a riot, in order to avoid paying up when inmates sue for injuries? What happens to the authority of government and to the
integrity of the system of justice?
If we can have for-profit prisons,
it strikes me that, by the same logic,
we can have for-profit courts and
we can expand private police
forces. We would then have a corporate state, literally. I do not want
to sound alarmist, but delegations
of public functions to private en-

uues can become fascism when, as
in inter-war Germany and Italy,
these entities delegate their authority back to a charismatic leader.
What gets lost in the shuffle are
checks and balances and a separation of powers.
A neat parallel to events in Europe can be found in our Depression's Blue Eagle, the National Recovery Administration. Each industry was supposed to devise its own
Code of Conduct-fix prices,
wages, production levels, and so

Haunting
Someone has told me of a holy place.
Clear as a bell it calls me over the water:
island , clapboard farmhouse, garden,
prayer.
I have dreamed it all this restless night,
shimmering within the mist, a reaching warmth;
island, a garden, books on sturdy shelves,
weathered hands.
This morning the fog has settled in,
hiding the simple paths I'd seen to reach
flowers bright in the farmhouse window,
prayer in all weathers.
"Fog, too, is part of the process.
Follow the buoy bell to the island;
white in the sunbreaks a farmhouse stands
and a garden for prayer."
And when I have found it, no one is there.
Bright with chrysanthemums, solid as houses,
inviting as bookshelves, light breaking through! am an island.
Island again , I walk my stark beaches,
gather white rocks, carry them home. Empty as a bell,
I am calling over the water,
"Here is a holy place."

Kathleen Mullen
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forth-in a massive privatization of
economic policy. The Supreme
Court decreed this scheme unconstitutional in Schechter Poult1y, the
"sick chicken" case. Had this not
happened, businessmen seemed desperate enough to cede additional
powers to Franklin D. Roosevelt,
who would face little political opposition after the 1936 elections.
We may not be so lucky next time;
the Court may not be so conservative and the president may not be
so democratically-inclined.

We must fight to regain
caring attitudes because
the pursuit of a narrow
self-interest is
counter-productive in
an increasingly
interdependent world.
A less far-fetched prediction is
offered by Lekachman: privatizations seem "fated to replicate the
expensive history of the militaryindustrial complex, complete with
conflicts of interest on the part of
bureaucrats who plan to move into
the very private sector with which
they officially deal. . . ." Ossified
corporate
and
governmental
bureaucracies will wage a "phony
war" with each other on the basis
of the principles of creative accounting.
The citizens' duty here, as elsewhere, is to learn which questions
to ask, and to demand reliable answers before following the "experts" down the primrose path.
That path leads, as we know, to an
"efficient " nuclear power and to
Vietnam, the experts' war. We
shou ld not IJe fooled by a few experiments that arc temporarily successful because of pressure to perform induced by close observation.
Could General Motors really
manage public schools effectively
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without violating our beliefs about
individual rights and self-governance? If General Dynamics is so
inefficient a defense contractor,
how could it run a prison efficiently? (General Dynamics has acquired one of almost everything
else, and it is only a matter of time
before it tries to acquire a prison,
perhaps as a source of cheap labor
for its coal mines.) If Volkswagen,
Airbus, British Petroleum, and Credit Lyonnais have proved fairly efficient, why wouldn't similar public
corporations be equally efficient in
America? Isn't the threat of creating such a public corporation the
only thing that will force our oil
companies to behave?
There is nothing more difficult
to define than the public interest.
But if we do not even try to define
it as best we can, we certain ly will
never discover what it might mean
for us. Maybe we tolerate the idea
of for-profit prisons because they
seem to absolve us of responsibility
for the difficult remaking of inmates into valued members of society. The social costs of recidivism
will remain , however, even if corporations reap some of the benefits.
As with our penology, many aspects of the War on Pow~rty were
poorly designed. But much of the
public care and concern that provoked this War were genu ine
enough, and we have apparently
lost them. We must fight to regain
caring attitudes because the pursuit
of a narrow self-interest is counterproductive in an increasingly interdependent world with a fragile
ecology and nuclear balance, and
with huge gaps between rich and
poor people and nations. Ultimately, attempts to define the public interest are acts of faith, faith in
our ability to learn from the likes
of the Romans and the Vandals,
and faith that there will be a future
which can be made better for
everyone.

••
••

Film & the Novel
Edward Byrne
II. Film versus Novel
Even a very lame movie tends to crush
a book.
-John Updike
Smnl'lirnes wlu'n you've Tead the novel,
it. gd-1 in the way of the images on the
SCTI111rt .

-Roger Ebert
These two opinions, apparently
in opposition to one another, reflecting the individual bias brought
by their authors to the relationship
between novels and films, also represent an accurate indication of the
ongoing rivalry underlying the
ways in which many of the members of the two media eye each
other's works.
Moreover, these comments demonstrate an awareness of some of
the subtle, but controlling influences the two art forms can exert
over the audience they share. The
novel's position as America's dominant art form, held so securely for
the first half of the twentieth century, has ended: film has assumed
its place as our society's premier art
form. Nevertheless, novelists such
as Updike, as well as many
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academics in English departments
across the country, still struggle to
insure that the novel is depicted, if
not as dominant as it once was, at
least as more artistically prominent
in the critical ranking of the two
forms.
Tom McDonough, in the unique
position of being both a fictionwriter and a professional cameraman, characterizes such thinking in
"That Great Blank Page, the
Screen," an essay on the relationship between film and the contemporary novel: "Novelists may find
consolation in their faith that the
written word is wiser, more definitive. Prose, they maintain, is the
true cinema verite; the novel is best
at conveying the experience of
walking around in the world. The
attentive writer is still able to skip
around the sensorium more adroitly, more evocatively than the
cameraman. And there are times
when the merest preposition is
slicker than zooming in." Perhaps
the popularity war has been lost,
but maybe a moral victory can yet
be claimed--or so the rationale appears to be.
Still, despite the tension evident
in the rhetoric employed by many
of the proponents of the two
forms, there is a certain degree of
irony in the revelation that a large
number of the movies produced
each year are adapted from or
based upon novels and, to a lesser
extent, plays. In fact, more than
two dozen Pulitzer-Prize-winning
novels have been translated to the
screen, most successfully. These include such excellent films as The
Magnificent Ambersons, The Grapes of
Wrath, The Old Man and the Sea, The
Caine Mutiny, To Kill a Mockingbird,
and The Color Purple, as well as two
which also garnered an Academy
Award as Best Picture, All the King's
Men and Gone with the Wind.
The full-length "feature film"
was introduced to the American
people in 1914, a decade after film
January, 1988

producers had begun to notice the
movie's potential as a popular
medium, one for which the public
would pay to be entertained. That
first year quite a few feature films
based upon various stage plays,
some of which had been dramatizations of classic novels (among them ,
Tess of the D'Urbervilles and The
Count of Monte Cristo), were produced. However, the following year
D.W. Griffith adapted Thomas
Dixon's
infamous
novel
The
Clansman for the screen as Birth of
a Nation, which one reviewer at the
time reported as an historical event
marking "the advent of the twodollar movie." This 1915 occurrence, with its accompanying success and notoriety, also initiated a
continuing Hollywood tradition that
favors film treatments of novels.
In the early days of Hollywood,
as movies became one of the guilty
pleasures enjoyed in the nation's
larger cities during the 1920s and
an inexpensive escape from the
hard times of the 1930s, and as
masses of scripts were needed
quickly for the many mov1es
churned out under the old studio
system, it was a matter of convenience to use the previously proven,
carefully crafted plots of novels
and to accept gratefully the audience appeal accompanying the
adaptation of a classic text or a current best-seller. In addition, studio
heads knew their fledgling film industry suffered from a lack of social and artistic respect; therefore,
adaptations of critically acclaimed
novels lent credibility to moviemaking as an art form, or at least
as an entertainment more highly
esteemed, more acceptable for the
average American family to attend.
More importantly, middle America
began its gradual openness toward
film attendance as a regular ritual,
started to equate the merits of the
two art forms, and initiated its shift
of allegiance from one medium to
the other.

However, in recent years, the use
of novels as the bases for film
scripts has become an economic
necessity-not so much for the fUm
industry, but more so for the publishing houses. The balance has
tilted toward film, and it is the
publisher now who needs the advantages that only an accomodation
with Hollywood can provide and
only a novel's association with a
movie can offer.
Today, the terms of authors' contracts, and in some instances even
the acceptance or rejection of their
novels, are determined by editors
who take into account the suitability of their writers' manuscripts as
future film projects. Some novels
are even sold to film companies before their release in order to finance publication and to guarantee
a profit. Additionally, many novels
will sell well when their attachment
to a film is stressed by an advertising campaign. For instance, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich and the
Pocket Books division of Simon &
Schuster, publishers of the hardcover and paperback editions of
The Color Purple, which won the
Pulitzer Prize and the American
Book Award for Alice Walker in
1983, sold many more copies (in
fact, The Color Purple was the
number one best-seller for the
1985-86 publishing year) when an
advertising blitz linked the novel to
the Steven Spielberg treatment.
Indeed, an ironic twist of fate
has created a climate in which the
health of American fiction may be
affected by the film industry as
continued publication of novels by
new,
untested
writers--often
thought one of the most essential
elements needed to keep American
fiction fresh and vital-increasingly
can occur only because of support
procured from the film producers.
One would expect, as reported in
recent
articles,
that
proven,
Pulitzer-Prize-winning authors such
as John Updike and Larry McMur29

try would command large bids
from film companies, and they
have: film rights for Updike's The
Witches of Eastwick were purchased
for $250,000 and McMurtry's
Texasville was sold for near! y $1
million. However, one has to be
startled when the same articles report that the following list of new
authors, all previously unpublished,
also had screen rights for their first
novels bought for large sums by
movie producers months before
scheduled publication dates: Glenn
Savan (White Palace)-$200,000
plus; Michael Chabon (The Mysteries
of Pittsburgh)-$300 ,000 plus ; Scott
Turow (Presumed Innocent)-$! million; H .F. Saint (M emoirs of an Invisible Man)-$1.4 million.
In an interview which appeared
in a recent issue of the New York
Times, Arthur Miller comments on
the influence film is having on contemporary fiction and theatre:
"None of us who write is willing to
confront the power film has had on
our culture. It's an immense pressure on the way we write, tell
stories, even think. The methodology of movie storytelling reflects
dreams. It's gotten deep into the
way we write. And it's perfectly admissible."
It is possible that in addition to
the form of American fiction being
influenced by the cinema, as James
Monaco also has pointed out in his
comparison
of
the
narrative
methods of contemporary fiction
and film, the roll of those who will
fill the ranks of new American fiction-writers will be determined to
some degree by filmmakers as well.
One can only be in full accord with
accounts suggested by a number of
other critics that consequences, arguably both positive and negative,
are already apparent as these influences fostered by film have contributed to the current trend toward
minimalist fiction and resulted in
an elevation in the evaluation of
young, overnight sensations, such
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as Jay Mcinerney, Bret Easton
Ellis, and Tama Janowitz, a trio of
presently popular authors among
those whose works create contemporary situations written in a style
which publishers believe tends to
translate more easily from the
printed page to celluloid.

Against his wishes,
Selznick had to revise a
few of the scenes of

Rebecca before the final
prints were produced.
However, in the midst of all this
harmony evident between factions
of film and the written word, a dissonant, or perhaps dissident, chord
could always be heard. Despite the
obvious interconnectedness of the
two art forms, the economic cooperation between the industries, and
the various degrees of dependency
on one another displayed by representatives of each medium , a
schism still exists between those
who believe filmmakers owe it to
the audience to be faithful in their
depictions of the novels from which
their characters and stories have
been borrowed and those who see
directors, despite their acknowledged indebtedness to these novels,
as independent artists under no obligation to act as second-rate
copiers tracing mere imitations of
others' original works.
This controversy has continued
since the first instance in which a
filmmaker placed on the silver
screen situations or characterizations which strayed from the actual
events or characters described in
the novel upon which they were
based, since the first time a director
determined that his own plot inventions and technical innovations
amending the script derived from a
novel need not reflect even the
explicit or implicit intentions of the
novelist.

A classic case of such a conflict
has been revealed by Leonard J.
Neff in his new book, Hitchcock and
Selz.nick: The Rich and Strange Collaboration of Alfred Hitchcock and David
0. Selznick in Hollywood, which,
among its reports, details disputes
between Hitchcock and Selznick
during the making of the legendary Rebecca (recently released on
videocassette). Selznick supported a
strict interpretation of the already
successful novel by Daphne Du
Maurier. (In fact, Du Maurier had
been Selznick's first choice to write
the screenplay.) However, Hitchcock, one of the first directors recognized by the French New Wave
critics as a true auteur, credited his
own success as a filmmaker to his
"ruthlessness in adapting stories for
the screen," and encouraged a
fresh treatment of the novel. Ironically, in this instance Selznick, as
producer, was able to exercise his
power over Hitchcock and overrule
the director's attempts at a vast
overhaul of the novel, but Selznick
was not able to overcome some of
the objections of the 1930s censors
to his version which demonstrated
total fidelity to the original. Against
his wishes, he had to revise a few
of the scenes before the picture's
final prints were produced. As a
result, Selznick still wound up with
a film not completely faithful to the
novel he revered so highly, yet a
film which received great acclaim.
Furthermore, despite the eleven
Academy Award nominations for
the movie, and despite the fact that
R ebecca initiated Alfred Hitchcock's
trans1Uon
from
England
to
America, enabling him to expand
his influence as a filmmaker, the
lack of an opportunity to place his
individual signature on the film led
the director later to disown the
project as "not a Hitchcock picture." Two decades before the auteur theory would be advanced,
Hitchcock was already advancing a
definition for the role of the direcThe Cresset

tor as the creative force in
filmmaking, even when working
from the established stories of successful novels.
By identifying himself only with
those films in which the original
scripts were redesigned by his camera's eye and , therefore, which
truly reflected his authorship,
Hitchcock was also setting a precedent for those directors who would
follow, a precedent that reserved
for the director a right to mold
works from any sources and declare them as his own. Just as
Shakespeare had discovered the
need to stamp a creative seal on his
adaptations of earlier tales in the
production of plays such as Hamlet,
making them forever his own and
establishing a new standard, today's
film directors have learned that
simply to duplicate a novel on the
screen is not enough, even if it
were possible to do so exactly.
T.S. Eliot had once declared in
response to cntlcism that his
poetry, particularly The Waste Land,
misused original sources, "Immature poets imitate; mature poets
steal; bad poets deface what they
take, and good poets make it into
something better, or at least something different." Likewise, good
filmmakers do not imitate. They
steal: they take from the original
and make something better, or at
least something different.
And so what if Robert Redford's
1970s Gatsby does not resemble the
fellow Fitzgerald introduced in
1925. So what if the innocent
Spanish girl Hemingway described
in For Whom the Bell Tolls is played
in the film version by a sophisticated Swedish beauty. So what if
George Miller's adaptation of The
Witches of Eastwick varies greatly
from John Updike's novel. And so
what if such well-made movies as
East of Eden, One Flew over the Cuckoo's Nest, The Natural, and an y
others one might care to add from
an admittedly long list are not
January , 1988

faithful to the original novels. Is it
not all for the better?
The audience benefits by being
able to experience the two versions,
the two visions. The difference between the film and the novel encourages viewers to read the book,
readers to view the film . It is this
difference which helped sell those

many millions of copies of The
Color Purple. It is this difference
which will keep the cinema, already
our dominant art form, from taking total control. It is this difference which should be encouraged,
appreciated, celebrated by all, especially film critics and novelists. Cl
[Part 2 of a series]

Poems with No Names:
The Sacred Pathway Ill
(After Lao Tzu)
6.

When I speak of the sacred pathway in the forest
Some
Liken it to Dante
Politely listen and nod
Laugh, then excuse their laughter
Examine every singular detail
These responses verify the sacredness
Of this pathway which
Is crooked but straight
Is long yet short
Is heavy yet light
Which leads away from where you are
Toward home where you began.
The pilgrim along this way, like good news,
Travels slow.

7.
One day I walked out to a ruined abbey
On the River Wear. On the way I forgot
All I ever knew but saw the grass
And grain and buttercups, stared down
A cow in her pasture. I no longer
Walk the paved roads
When I can walk the fields
And follow, for awhile at least,
What sages call The Mighty Way!

Travis DuPriest
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A Political
Progress
Dot Nuechterlein
Well, I won. That is to say, I
WON!!! It's Ms. Competitive Nature speaking here, but except for
Scrabble or Trivia or card games, it
is rare for me to go nose to nose
with an opponent, let alone come
out victorious.
This is January, when I begin
four years as a City Council
member, a position gained in the
November election. It goes against
all of my carefully nurtured and
well practiced group dynamics
principles to admit it, but wow, winning sure is fun!
Since this was my first try, and
since you may not be one of the infinitesimal number of persons ever
to run for public office, I'm dying
to tell you about it, start to finish.
Motivation-patriotic duty and all,
especially after living abroad; besides, the local party drafted me
for a seat becoming vacant and I
couldn't think of any reason not to
do what I wanted to do anyway.
Basic Research-greatest impact
made by any color combination is
black printing on bright yellow
stock, so choosing materials was
easy.
Strategy-attended
candidates'
workshops sponsored by state
party; I learned "Don't waste
money on glance-&-pitch stuff'locally, stress name and office, but
most other propaganda isn't effective. So first flyer had only last
name, office, plus party symbol and
VOTE crossed at 0 by DOT.
Handout-"give people community-related keepers"; opponent
had typical family portrait and list
of qualifications, but for fall m
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Hoosier-land I chose male and
female high school and University
basketball home game schedules
with slogans "Support your home
teams" and "Support Dot."
Parades-rode in two and enjoyed them a lot; the amount of
eye contact with bystanders is
amazing. ("That's your thing,
Mom," said child #3, "smiling and
waving.") During the Homecoming
parade my present and former students began chanting my name,
and the crowd joined in-what fun!

Some talked about women
as candidates; I didn't
want any votes just
because I am oneunless they couldn't
think of another reason.
Door to Door-the best part of all.
In 2 1/2 weeks I knocked on nearly
every door in my four precinctsaround 1,700 in all-and someone
answered at about 1,000. Everyone
friendly, some talkative (especially
several lonely senior citizens), a few
curious about me or local issues;
only two politely declined my handout (wrong party). Many assumed
at first I was a sales rep--several
husbands called their wives to deal
with me.
Some
people
talked
about
women as candidates; I didn't want
any votes just because I am oneunless they couldn't think of any
other reason, that is! Most wished
me luck: I see now how candidates
get false pictures of how they're
doing, because nearly everyone responds positively. But most people
don't vote: the other guy got 206
votes and I took 290, so we didn't
exactly create great civic fervor.
Biggest problem was keeping
track of where I'd been; the four
or so basic house plans in the district begin to blur together. Had to

go down one side of the street and
back the other, keeping to the
right, of course. (What else would
you expect from a Republican?)
Animals-this
non-"fido-phile"
swears the district has more dogs
than humans. Plus other species:
once no one answered at a home
where lights were on and drapes
open; turning to go, I saw a huge
beast lumber past the window. I
can't prove it was a bear, but do
dogs "lumber"?
And once just before knocking I
noticed this posted by a door:
"Warning. Enter at your own risk.
These premises are protected by
live cobras." Mercifully, the antidote was attached.
Yard Signs-they're big around
here, but I vetoed them: after the
first glance they lose impact, and it
costs a lot to say a little. Instead, on
election eve I made two dozen yellow posterboard flags with my first
name in black, stapled to short
stakes, and before dawn put them
along the main intersections of the
district to remind people to vote.
The Event-a reporter asked me
later what I had done on election
day. I reverted to childhood-years
ago on Christmas Eve day we used
to make the time pass by doing
chores, so now I took the day off
and cleaned my house. No way
could one day make up for weeks
of neglect, but it seemed a productive way to wait. I voted shortly before the polls closed; by then my
precinct captains thought I had
forgotten. (Child # 1 voted for the
first time that day-I think she
voted for me.)
The Victory-the party throws a
party, and people give you hugs
and handshakes, send flowers and
cards, and bring balloons and banners . The work is all still ahead,
but I'm raring to go.
The Future-a friend has already
suggested that next time I should
run for Matriarch. You'll be the
first to know.
Cl
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